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Nothing much could happen
Nothing we can’t shake
Oh we’re absolute beginners
With nothing much at stake
As long as you’re still smiling
There’s nothing more I need
I absolutely love you
But we’re absolute beginners
But if my love is your love
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Abstract
WHEN DO WE COOPERATE WITH ROBOTS?
Debora Zanatto
Robotic usage is entering the world into many diverse ways, from advanced
surgical areas to assistive technologies for disabled persons. Robots are increasingly
designed and developed to assist humans with everyday tasks. However, they are
still perceived as tools to be manipulated and controlled by humans, rather than
complete and autonomous helpers. One of the main reasons can be addressed
to the development of their capabilities to appear credible and trustworthy. This
dissertation explores the challenge of interactions with social robots, investigating
which specific situations and environments lead to an increase in trust and coop-
eration between humans and robots. After discussing the multifaceted concept of
anthropomorphism and its key role on cooperation through literature, three open
issues are faced: the lack of a clear definition of anthropomorphic contribution to
robots acceptance, the lack of defined anthropomorphic boundaries that should
not be crossed to maintain a satisfying interaction in HRI and the absence of a real
cooperative interaction with a robotic peer. In Chapter 2, the first issue is addressed,
demonstrating that robots credibility can be affected by experience and anthro-
pomorphic stereotype activation. Chapter 3, 4, 5 and 6 are focussed in resolving
the remaining two issues in parallel. By using the Economic Investment Game
in four different studies, the emergence of human cooperative attitudes towards
robots is demonstrated. Finally, the limits of anthropomorphism are investigated
through comparisons of social human-like behaviours with machine-like static na-
ture. Results show that the type of payoff can selectively affect trust and cooperation
in HRI: in case of low payoff participants’ increase their tendency to look for the
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Sometimes the work was hard; the implements had been designed for
human beings and not for animals, and it was a great drawback that no
animal was able to use any tool that involved standing on his hind legs.




In this chapter, a literature overview on factors affecting cooperation in Human-
Robot Interaction is given, although it is also extended in the individual following
chapters.
1.1 How do we cooperate with humans?
Although not unique to our species, human cooperation has the scale and scope far
beyond other mammals and forms a central underpinning of our psychology, culture,
1
Introduction
and success as a species (Boyd & Richerson, 2009). Most of our decisions depend on
social interactions and therefore are based on concomitant choices of others (Sanfey,
2007). Consequently, we are constantly checking others’ behaviour and producing
or changing our response to it. When proposing a suggestion or a solution to a
problem, for example, people look for others’ approval, thus indicating that a final
decision needs to be found together (Sebanz, Bekkering, & Knoblich, 2006). Oskamp
(1971) proposed that there can be no positive social relationship or outcome from
cooperation unless both parties adopt a cooperative attitude. Therefore, to cooperate
effectively, it is necessary to arrive at an understanding of the others’ behaviour such
that equal and fair allocation of effort and resources leads to a joint solution beneficial
to both parties. Cooperation is conditional upon the expectation of reciprocation
(Perugini, Gallucci, Presaghi, & Ercolani, 2003). That is, cooperation is enhanced only
when there are an understanding and willingness to establish a common ground,
engendering a high level of trust in the partner.
Within previous literature, these types of cooperative interactions have been
exhaustively examined, most prominently using the experimental paradigm of
Behavioural Game Theory. In game theoretic social dilemmas, one player’s strategy
can be considered cooperative or competitive to the extent it affects collective rather
than selfish interests (Deutsch, 1958). Within this domain, the relative coherence
of strategies adopted by cooperative partners can provide a useful measure of
conflict resolution or avoidance. Once partners establish a set of mutual beliefs
regarding the current state of the task, the respective roles and the capabilities and
responsibilities of each partner, then these behaviours tend to be maintained over
time (Pilisuk, Skolnick, & Overstreet, 1968). Conversely, if partners are focussed
upon maximising their own rewards, then their adopted strategies would have
reduced coherence. Partners are more likely to adopt a shifting pattern of active
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and reactive strategies as they seek dominance over an adaptive opponent. In most
established scenarios the adoption of a fixed mutual non-cooperative strategy is
less generous than that of a cooperative strategy (Van Lange, Joireman, Parks, &
Van Dijk, 2013). Cooperative strategies can be encouraged through the adoption of
control mechanisms that punish non-coherent strategies or behaviours, such that
cooperation is more profitable than non-cooperation (Gächter & Herrmann, 2009),
with partners shown to use personally costly punishment mechanisms to increase
future cooperation (Fehr & Gächter, 2002).
A recent study by Wu, Paeng, Linder, Valdesolo, and Boerkoel (2016) suggests that
these types of cooperative interactions may also extend to human-robot partnerships,
with cooperative behaviours in a trust game with a robot found to be very similar to
players’ behaviours with another human.
1.2 Do we cooperate with robots?
With the development of new robotic technologies, robots have the potential of
being applied in many fields as reliable helpers. For example, the growing interest
in the robotic application in industrial environments has allowed to improve and
speed production and manufacturing processes. By involving robots in tasks like
acquisition and manipulation, a reduction in human workload, costs and errors can
be assured. Furthermore, the potential benefits deriving from HRI can be extended
also to other fields, like agriculture, military missions, surgery and assistive care.
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1.2.1 Human-Robot Cooperation in agriculture
Agricultural robots are autonomous or semi-autonomous systems that can help
in solving problems at several stages of the process. Used mainly in repetitive
tasks, these robots are designed to reduce farmers’ workload and reduce production
costs. Adamides (2016) built an interface that permits a human to teleoperate a
pesticide-spraying robot. Freitas, Zhang, Hamner, Bergerman, and Kantor (2012)
tested a localisation system for a vehicle used in tree fruit production. Bechar and
Edan (2003) evaluated different collaboration levels in an HRI target recognition
system for melon harvesting. Berenstein and Edan (2017) designed a robotic sprayer
platform which decreased the spayed material by 50%.
Although there is evidence that HRC can have a positive impact on agriculture,
harvesting and handling fruits are still challenging and complex problems. One
of the main reason can be found on the high variability of the agricultural objects
(i.e., colour, texture, shape), as well as the environmental conditions (e.g., changing
illumination directions, shading, and targets occlusion).
1.2.2 Human-Robot Cooperation in military missions and rescue
robotics
Robotics has been recently applied in military environments and search and rescue
missions. These fields mainly focus on increasing the efficiency of military missions,
as well as supporting victims of disasters or citizens in danger. The benefits of these
applications derive, in particular, from increasing the speed and accuracy of the
emergency response. For example, a semi-autonomous control architecture has been
developed for robots in Urban search and rescue (USAR) environments, allowing
them to make decisions about which tasks need to be carried out at a given time (Liu,
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2019). Robots can also be programmed to autonomously fly and navigate through
the environment or recognise fires and explosions (Bruemmer, Dudenhoeffer, &
Marble, 2002).
Nevertheless, these applications are still on a simulative level, mostly due to the
nature of the events involved. Data collection in dangerous situations, in fact, can be
difficult or even impossible. For this reason, most of the developments and tests are
still performed in robot test arenas (Jacoff, Messina, Weiss, Tadokoro, & Nakagawa,
2003).
1.2.3 Human-Robot Cooperation in surgery
Surgical procedures are becoming increasingly complex and require more refined
skills. Minimal invasive techniques, for example, can limit the complications and
reduce patients’ recovery time. However, these techniques require extensive training.
A solution to the problem could be found on robotics applications for surgery. Among
these, robotic-assisted minimally invasive surgery (RMIS) can offer a functional
alternative to manual surgery (Palep, 2009). For example, The Intuitive Surgical da
Vinci®SP 1098 platform is composed of four interactive robotic arms for a great
variety of laparoscopic procedures (Maurice, Ramirez, & Kaouk, 2017).
Unfortunately, most of the robotic platforms are still under development, mainly
due to the numerous challenges that robotics in surgery still have to face, in particular,
the limited perception abilities of the robots in surgical sites and the large number of
DOFs needed in such systems (for a review see Brodie and Vasdev, 2018).
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1.2.4 Socially assistive robots
With the coming of increasing ageing population and the consequential serious
problems to our society, the interest HRI has moved from a mere instrumental to an
assistive and social role. Robots could offer support in various tasks in our daily life,
in welfare applications and office automation.
In particular, there is increasing interest in using socially assistive robots (SAR)
as caretakers for the elderly and people with disabilities (Martinez-Martin & del
Pobil, 2018). Paro –a baby seal robot– and NeCoRo –a cat-like robot– are designed to
improve elderly quality of life by reducing distress and facilitate daily living activities
(Kidd, Taggart, & Turkle, 2006; Libin & Cohen-Mansfield, 2004; McGlynn, Snook,
Kemple, Mitzner, & Rogers, 2014; Nakashima, Fukutome, & Ishii, 2010; Sabanovic,
Bennett, Chang, & Huber, 2013). Aido and BUDDY can provide companionship
and assistance in daily activities like reminding medications, appointments and
upcoming events (Gleaton, Shirley, & Carolyn, 2018). Mobile robots like HOBBIT,
which is capable of taking commands from the user and recognise gestures, can also
be used as service devices in assisting mobility and emergency recognition (Bajones
et al., 2018; Fischinger et al., 2016).
Furthermore, robots can play a significant role in education (Pandey & Gelin,
2016). The humanoid Robovie, capable of human-like expressions, can recognise
individuals and encourage interactive learning by increasing children engagement
in social activities (Kanda, Hirano, Eaton, & Ishiguro, 2004).
Additionally, social robots seem to be effective in treating patients with Autistic
Disorders (Thill, Pop, Belpaeme, Ziemke, & Vanderborght, 2012). The NAO robot is
one of the main players in this scenario, which has been shown to improve the social
skills of children affected by Autism Spectrum Disorder (Brockevelt, Manner, Richter,
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Fig. 1.1 A team of social robots.
& Elison, 2018; Lytridis, Vrochidou, Chatzistamatis, & Kaburlasos, 2018; Tapus et al.,
2012).
The great potential that robots could have in improving human quality of life has
aroused the need for establishing mutual cooperation between humans and robots
(Fong, Nourbakhsh, & Dautenhahn, 2003). Research has mainly focused on the
subordinate and assistive role of the robot (e.g. Lenz et al., 2008; Huang, Cakmak, and
Mutlu, 2015; Goetz and Kiesler, 2002; Severinson-Eklundh, Green, and Hüttenrauch,
2003; Hinds, Roberts, and Jones, 2004), while cooperation with a proper robotic peer
has not been fully investigated. Moreover, most of the experiments conducted so
far were based on self-reports, questionnaires and interviews (e.g. Nomura, Kanda,
Suzuki, and Kato, 2008; Yagoda and Gillan, 2012; Charalambous, Fletcher, and Webb,
2016). Although these measurements allow collecting people’s overt opinions, they
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exclude the possibility of measuring spontaneous and automatic behaviours. These
type of measurements could permit to explore the implicit processes responsible for
the establishment of functional interaction with robots.
1.3 It’s all a matter of acceptance
As robots would become more present in human environments, it is increasingly
important that they are capable of interacting socially. In human and animal societies,
in fact, collaboration is an essential skill critical to learning, working and everyday
social interactions. As social skills in humans are necessary for collaboration, robots
also need to be equipped with these skills to be a productive and valuable collaborator
in a wide variety of contexts. In this regards, social robots can change the conception
of technology by promoting pro-social and collaborative actions and increasing team
cohesiveness.
HRC focuses on applications where robots and humans work together to complete
a task. This field faces particular challenges related to people’s expectations and
mental models about their team partners that can be not satisfied. In particular,
the robots capabilities and skills perception become the main problem to solve;
robots are still perceived as untrustworthy machines, intruding people’s life and
environment, thus cooperation is strongly affected (P. Hancock, Billings, & Schaefer,
2011). Consequently, one of the pivotal questions in social robotics is how to design
a robot and which features (e.g., appearance, movements, voice, behaviours) can
improve its interaction with humans. What makes us accept a robot and willing to
work with it?
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1.3.1 Theories and factors affecting robot acceptance
Despite the large development and interest in robotics, a theoretical model specific
to robot acceptance is still missing (Beer, Prakash, Mitzner, & Rogers, 2011; Heerink,
Krose, Evers, & Wielinga, 2009) (for a review of technology acceptance theories see
Table 1.1).
The Technology Acceptance Model (TAM, Davis, Bagozzi, and Warshaw, 1989)
proposes two main variables that affect acceptance: perceived usefulness (the feeling
that using a particular system will improve the performance) and perceived ease of
use (the perception of effort reduction in using the system). This model, however,
has received several criticisms due to its restrictive vision of technology acceptance
and the exclusion of several social variables that could affect people’s interaction
with technology (Bagozzi, 2007; Taylor & Todd, 1995).
The Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology Model (UTAUT,
Venkatesh, Morris, Davis, and Davis, 2003) unified components from eight different
technology acceptance models and defines acceptance on the basis of four main
constructs: performance expectancy (expectations toward the system efficiency),
effort expectancy (perceived ease of use), social influence (evaluation on the impor-
tance of using the system by others) and facilitating conditions (believes about the
organisations supporting the use of the system). Although it has been considered
the more robust technology acceptance model, criticisms focus on the number of
predictive variables kept into account (Bagozzi, 2007).
The existence of numerous models for acceptance in HRI has led to the most
diverse interpretations and investigations. De Graaf and Allouch (2013) identified
variables like usefulness, adaptability, enjoyability, sociability, companionship and
perceived behavioural control. Beer et al. (2011) proposed three specific variables as
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Table 1.1 Technology acceptance theories
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potentially affecting robot acceptance: function, social capabilities and appearance.
They also assumed that a discrepancy between the robot functionalities or social
skills and the user’s expectations would reduce its acceptance. On the other hand,
the robot human-likeness level would have the same effect on user perception and
judgments. Lastly, Gaudiello, Zibetti, Lefort, Chetouani, and Ivaldi (2016) identified
six correlates of robot acceptance: representational, physical, behavioural, functional,
social, and cultural. Among these dimensions, they underlined the role of functional
and social acceptance as being particularly effective on HRI.
Among all these different theorisations and interpretations, three key factors
in affecting robot acceptance have been found on performance capability, social
competence and appearance. These main factors share a common and fundamental
indicator of robot acceptance, which is the development of a sense of trust on the
robot (Lewis, Sycara, & Walker, 2018; van den Brule, Dotsch, Bijlstra, Wigboldus,
& Haselager, 2014) and has been increasingly used to measure the quality of HRI
(Gaudiello et al., 2016; Schaefer, 2013).
1.4 It takes trust to accept a robot
Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995) defined trust as "the willingness of a party
to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the
other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the
ability to monitor or control that other party”. As the authors stated, trust involves
interdependence, so that a person (called ’trustor’) depends on another (called
’trustee’) to accomplish his/her task. According to their view, the characteristics of
the trustor will affect the trustor behaviour. These characteristics include:
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• ability: skills and competencies that make the trustor believe that the trustee
has the resources and the expertise to successfully complete the task;
• benevolence: the belief that the trustee wants to improve the trustor condition,
thus the perception that the trustee is oriented toward the trustor;
• integrity: the expectation that the trustee will follow some principles that the
trustor finds fundamental to the interaction.
Based on these three components, the level of trust can vary on a continuum that
goes from low to high: if the trustor perceives high levels of ability, benevolence and
integrity, the trustee would be categorised as trustworthy; on the opposite, lower
levels would lead to lower trust.
The main goal of social HRI is to establish strong relationships in which people
find robots suggestions credible, acceptable and usable. One of the necessary
elements for building a social human-robot relationship is trust (P. Hancock et al.,
2011; Kidd & Breazeal, 2005; Ullman & Malle, 2018). As Salem and Dautenhahn
(2015) stated: "Especially with regard to critical decisions, trust plays an important
role in human interactions and could therefore help to increase the robot’s acceptance
in its role as a collaborative partner (Hinds et al., 2004; J. J. Lee, Knox, Wormwood,
Breazeal, & DeSteno, 2013). Since trust is strongly linked to persuasiveness in social
interaction contexts (Touré-Tillery & McGill, 2015), it could also affect people’s
willingness to cooperate with the robot (Freedy, DeVisser, Weltman, & Coeyman,
2007), for example, by accepting information or following its suggestions". The less
people trust a robot, in fact, the earlier they intervene during a task completion
(De Visser, Parasuraman, Freedy, Freedy, & Weltman, 2006; Steinfeld et al., 2006).
Although a reliable robotic trustee could not embed all the features listed by
Mayer et al. (1995), it still shares some common characteristics that are also related
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to robots acceptance. Starting from the previously listed factors affecting acceptance,
a robotic trustee would be expected to:
• have the skills and expertise to positively accomplish the task (performance
capability);
• be oriented toward the human trustor and follow his/her beliefs (social compe-
tence).
1.4.1 Factors affecting trust in HRI
In a meta-review on the factors affecting trust in HRI, P. A. Hancock et al. (2011)
mentioned three main sources: human-related, environmental and robot-related
factors. Human-related factors include personality traits, attitudes toward robots
and engagement capabilities. In their review, the authors found little evidence
for the effect of this source. Environmental factors resulted in having a moderate
effect, depending in particular on the type of task, in-group membership and
communication. Interestingly, robot-related factors were listed as the most important
contributors and have been subsequently categorised as performance-based and
attribute-based factors (Oleson, Billings, Kocsis, Chen, & Hancock, 2011).
Performance-based characteristics embed all the features that can affect perfor-
mance, ability and functionality perception. Reduced reliability and the presence of
numerous errors, for example, can decrease trust in a robotic system (Desai et al.,
2012; Dzindolet, Peterson, Pomranky, Pierce, & Beck, 2003; Salem, Lakatos, Amirab-
dollahian, & Dautenhahn, 2015). On the other hand, if a robot shows consistency
in performance, trust can be maintained. Moreover, robots that are functionally




Attribute-based characteristics comprise all the components related to the design
and the socio-physical features of the robot. Some of these features include anthro-
pomorphic appearance, closeness, predictability and social competence. Shiomi,
Nakata, Kanbara, and Hagita (2017) reported higher preferences for a robot capable
of hugging people, as well as an increase of motivation when a robot is capable
of giving recommendations (Shiomi et al., 2010). Lohani, Stokes, McCoy, Bailey,
and Rivers (2016) showed that matching social and emotional behaviours affects
trust in a collaborative task. Martelaro, Nneji, Ju, and Hinds (2016) reported that
their participants developed trust and feelings of companionship with a vulnerable
robot. Furthermore, several studies indicated an increase in trust, motivation and
cooperation with a highly predictable robot (Billings et al., 2012; Dragan, Bauman,
Forlizzi, & Srinivasa, 2015; J. D. Lee & See, 2004). Interestingly, the mere presence of
a robot compared to a virtual agent and the reduction of the distance between the
human and the robot create positive feelings and increase trust (Bainbridge, Hart,
Kim, & Scassellati, 2008; MacArthur, Stowers, & Hancock, 2017).
All the present findings suggest that humans’ perception of the robot performance
and its social competences are key factors in developing and maintaining trust in
HRI. However, a precise description of the social characteristic that a robot should
embed is missing and far from clear. In this regards, a contribution capable of
clarifying the puzzling picture or social HRI is impelling.
Finally, among the attribute-based characteristics affecting trust in HRI, anthro-
pomorphism has been rated as one of the greatest contributors (Duffy, 2003). Due to
its multifaceted properties, anthropomorphism is treated in a separate paragraph.
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1.5 Anthropomorphism in HRI
The tendency to anthropomorphise is fundamental to our psychology, a cross-cultural
phenomenon with a history established in pre-historic art (Conard, 2003) and coined
in ancient Greek philosophy (Xenophanes, as cited by Lesher, 1992). It has been
proposed (Epley, Waytz, & Cacioppo, 2007) that a process of induction lies at the
core of this highly prevalent phenomenon, one in which we use highly accessible
knowledge on the self or human society as a base upon which we can explain or
predict the unknown. Ascribing human intentions to unintentional agents, described
as the intentional stance by Dennett (1989), eases our uncertainty on how we can
reason about or describe these agents. This stance would also make it easier to
form social connections with non-human agents, extending our fundamental desire
for social relationships (Baumeister & Leary, 1995) outside of humankind. Thus,
anthropomorphism would appear to offer us a simpler, more familiar world that is
richer in social interaction, giving us greater confidence in our interactions with it.
Historically, research in this area has been dominated by studies on the accuracy
and functionality of our anthropomorphic beliefs (Cheney & Seyfarth, 1992; Hauser,
2001), as well as their potential benefits (J. S. Kennedy, 1992; Nass, Isbister, & Lee, 2000;
Tam, Lee, & Chao, 2013). Another major area of research has been the examination of
the factors that influence the extent to which people anthropomorphise non-human
agents. Guthrie and Guthrie (1993) noted the attribution of intentions and human-
like mental states to literary characters were related to their morphological similarity
to ourselves. This influence of morphology seems relatively straightforward; objects
featuring human features (Baron-Cohen, 1997; Carey & Spelke, 1994; Dennett,
1989) or shape (Arnheim, 1969) are seen as more human-like than those that do
not. Shape, in particular, is used as one of the earliest cues to object animacy in
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infancy (Graham & Poulin-Dubois, 1999). Additional features such as imitation,
communication or indicators of intentionality can also influence the extent to which
we anthropomorphise an agent (Dennet, 1997). However, similarity to human motion
is probably the next most important cue after that of morphology (R. W. Mitchell
& Hamm, 1997). Movement can give the impression of life (Tremoulet & Feldman,
2000) and even simple geometric figures can be anthropomorphised as long as the
temporal relationship of their movements conforms to our own (Heider & Simmel,
1944). Previously mindless agents whose movements are slowed down or speeded
up (Morewedge, Preston, & Wegner, 2007) to approximate human motion can gain
mental states, while biologically meaningful motion can also lend intention to
non-human agents (Dittrich & Lea, 1994).
Humans have the natural tendency to make anthropomorphic assumptions about
the surrounding environment, animals, weathering, planets, or even geometrical
figures (Burghardt, 2017; Eddy, Gallup Jr, & Povinelli, 1993; Guthrie & Guthrie, 1993;
Milstein, 2011). Consequently, anthropomorphism has been increasingly used to
sell products (Portal, Abratt, & Bendixen, 2018; Tuškej & Podnar, 2018) and design
technology, particularly robots (Duffy, 2003; Duffy & Joue, 2004). On the attempt to
explain the anthropomorphisation of non-human agents, Epley et al. (2007) proposed
a Three-Factor Theory, in which seeing human in non-human depends on:
• Elicited agent knowledge: since people’s knowledge about non-human agents
is less wide compared to humans, applying an anthropomorphic interpretation
to non-agents becomes a simpler and costless solution;
• Effectance motivation: people have an innate tendency and curiosity for
understanding, control, and predict, which in turn, increase the tendency to
anthropomorphise;
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• Sociality motivation: the need for social connections and the tendency to avoid
loneliness force people to treat non-human agents like human companions.
Following Epley’s theory, studies have found that as a robot appears more
human-like, people are more likely to appreciate it and work with it (Goetz, Kiesler,
& Powers, 2003), follow its instructions, (Kiesler, Powers, Fussell, & Torrey, 2008)
and even empathise with it(Riek, Rabinowitch, Chakrabarti, & Robinson, 2009a).
Providing an anthropomorphic form to a robot might not be sufficient to facilitate
people’s interaction with it (Kahn Jr et al., 2007).
Research on verbal communication has focused on the role of accents and natural
voices in increasing acceptance (Eyssel, De Ruiter, Kuchenbrandt, Bobinger, & Hegel,
2012; Markowitz, 2017; Tamagawa, Watson, Kuo, MacDonald, & Broadbent, 2011).
Investigations on non-verbal communication (Breazeal, Kidd, Thomaz, Hoffman, &
Berlin, 2005) instead, have focused on gestures and gaze, showing that gaze shifting
during social interactions makes robots more enjoyable (Admoni & Scassellati, 2017).
Moreover, robots performing joint attention are rated as more competent (Huang &
Thomaz, 2010).
Even making mistakes is reported to increase the perception of the robot human-
likeness (Mirnig et al., 2017). Ragni, Rudenko, Kuhnert, and Arras (2016) compares
an erroneous robot with a perfect one during a reasoning task. The authors found
that the erroneous robot triggered more positive emotions. Robots that exhibit
typical human behaviours, like cheating, are also perceived as more human-like
(Short, Hart, Vu, & Scassellati, 2010). In their study, Short and colleagues compared
three robot behaviours during a "rock-paper-scissors" game between a robot and a
human: a control condition with a normally behaving robot, a verbal-cheat condition
with a robot lying about winning the game and an action-cheat condition in which
the robot additionally changed its gesture to the winning gesture. The verbal-cheat
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was interpreted as a mechanical malfunctioning of the robot. On the opposite, the
action-cheat condition was perceived as an intentional behaviour of the robot.
Anthropomorphism also changes with experience, as previous research suggested
(Fussell, Kiesler, Setlock, & Yew, 2008; Lemaignan, Fink, & Dillenbourg, 2014). In
Fussell et al. (2008), participants rated a robot as possessing traits, moods and
feelings more after they interacted with it than after they simply imagined one.
Thus, interacting with a robot increases its anthropomorphism. In outlining a formal
model of anthropomorphism, Lemaignan et al. (2014) added that the interaction
context also influences the dynamics of anthropomorphism. Although humans can
build an ’anthropomorphic model’ of the robot during the interaction, the presence
of unpredicted behaviours may lead to an increase of anthropomorphism.
1.5.1 Is it all anthropomorphism fault?
It could be concluded that anthropomorphism is a generalizable instrument that
always facilitates interaction with robots. Nevertheless, it appears to be unnecessary
or even counterproductive under certain conditions (Goudey & Bonnin, 2016). Too
much human-likeness, in fact, can result in the negative Uncanny Valley effect
(Masahiro, 1970), evoking feelings of disgust and eeriness. Androids, for example,
have a striking resemblance with human appearance (Minato, Shimada, Ishiguro, &
Itakura, 2004) but as soon as they start to move or speak, their machine qualities are
immediately evident (Becker-Asano, Ogawa, & Nishio, 2010). Goudey and Bonnin
(2016) suggested that anthropomorphism is associated with the levels of familiarity
and practical experience with technology. Hence, people with less technological
experience, or reduced exposure to robots, are less keen to accept a human-like agent
over a machine type of robot.
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Anthropomorphism seems to be also task-related. For example, people feel
less embarrassed in interacting with a non anthropomorphic robot during medical
check-ups (Bartneck, Bleeker, Bun, Fens, & Riet, 2010). Bethel and Murphy (2010)
instead demonstrated that a non-anthropomorphic robot is rated more calming in
Search and Rescue applications.
These studies indicate that anthropomorphism in HRI is not limited to the
physical world. Perceiving robots as agents possessing a mind and the ability to
execute intentional actions is equally affecting human’s perception of the agent.
Moreover, anthropomorphism is also a context-related instrument, that can endanger
the interaction whenever used in the wrong way. Recent research demonstrates the
need to define a more precise threshold of anthropomorphism. Moreover, these
studies bring to light the need of investigating under which circumstances human-
like features are positively affecting HRI and when, instead, a robot should be just a
robot.
1.6 Aims, Scope and Research Questions
Cooperation with robots is a fundamental aspect of HRI. Increasing people’s willing-
ness to interact and cooperate with robots, would potentially increase their usage
and guarantee a satisfying and high-quality performance. Nevertheless, cooperation
outside of the industrial field has not been studied in depth, mostly because of the
many issues HRI research has faced in terms of trust and acceptance. In order to
improve cooperation with robots, it is fundamental to explore the boundaries of
acceptance and trust in HRI. Although the studies that have investigated these two
aspects have reported a wide list of elements, an objective guideline is missing.
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This thesis focuses on investigating trust and cooperation in HRI in different
social scenarios and the role of anthropomorphism in affecting this cooperation.
Specifically, it explores how we extend the use of social collaborative cues to robots
(both single, in groups, and the role of leadership), and what are the necessary
requirements for that extension. This includes aspects of form, behaviour, gaze, and
speech. For all these reasons, this thesis will cover the following questions:
• Can anthropomorphic stereotype activation affect robots credibility?
• How does trust in HRI evolve over time and under what specific circumstances
anthropomorphism increases trust in HRI?
• Can we cooperate with robots as we cooperate with other humans? What is
the role of anthropomorphism in affecting cooperation?
• Can humans choose to strategically imitate a robot and how would anthropo-
morphism influence social learning in HRI?
• Would humans conform to a robotic leader or would they prefer to follow
a dissenting minority? Which features should a robotic leader embed to be
trusted?
The following chapters attempt to answer these questions. In Chapter 2, the
anthropomorphic level of robots is manipulated in order to establish the limit
of acceptance. More specifically, participants are hypothesised to accept a robot
suggestion through anthropomorphic stereotype generalisation. Throughout two
experiments, participants’ perceptions and judgements of machine-like robots are
studied before and after being exposed to a human-like robot. The opposite scenario
is also investigated in search of a dehumanisation effect for anthropomorphic robots.
Results demonstrate that humans are capable of transferring the anthropomorphic
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stereotype from a human-like robot to a machine-like one, thus opening to the
possibility that people could learn to accept a robot from experience and stereotype
activation.
In Chapter 3, trust between humans and robots is investigated by manipulating
the robot anthropomorphic features of voice and joint attention, as well as its
reliability. The main core of this study is to establish under which conditions, both in
terms of robot features and performance, anthropomorphism is a required element to
build and increase trust in robots. In this chapter, the development of trust over time
is investigated by using the same experimental method that is subsequently applied
to all further studies. By using the Investment Game, participants’ willingness
to invest (and thus trust) in a more or less anthropomorphic robot is explored.
Results from this experiment demonstrate that trust can evolve over time. More
importantly, results show that anthropomorphism affects HRI in a selective way.
While under specific circumstances (low payoff condition) it can increase the quality
of the interaction, in others it can have a negative impact (like in case of high payoff).
Chapter 4 explores the emergence of cooperative attitudes in humans when
interacting with a robot as a proper peer. Participants have to decide whether to
cooperate with a more or less strategically selfish robot, in investing in another
robotic agent. This experiment demonstrates that humans are capable of treating a
robot as an ’au pair’ companion and apply human social cooperative behaviours to
it. Moreover, the selectiveness of anthropomorphism is shown to be consistent with
the results in Chapter 3.
In Chapter 5, the cooperative scenario is extended to social learning. Here
participants are hypothesised to strategically imitate a robot cooperative behaviour
toward another robot. By exposing participants to a robotic model, it is shown that
humans are disposed to copy a robot strategy whenever it is considered successful
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and reliable. Furthermore, anthropomorphism is also manipulated to increase the
imitative tendency.
Stemming from the evidence that a robot can be a trustworthy source of imitation,
in Chapter 6 the dyadic human-robot cooperation is extended to group cooperation
and the role of robotic leadership in HRI is investigated. Specifically, the chapter
is focused on the human’s tendency to cooperate with a group of robots and to
conform to the leader. Participants are asked to decide whether to conform or dissent
from investing in a group of robots. The manipulation of the followers’ consensus
to the robotic leader, shows that participants conform to a leader that is receiving
the overall consensus. On the opposite, they show dissenting behaviours when the
leader loses the majority support. Lastly, two main leader features, namely height
and prototypicality, are manipulated through two experiments to test whether these
features can affect leader conformity. Results demonstrate that the physical attributes
of a robotic leader increase conformity only when participants are exposed to a
dissenting minority.
1.7 Contributions
This thesis is part of the collaborative THRIVE project, funded by the Air Force
Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR). The aim of the project is to investigate the
embodiment and socio-cognitive mechanisms in the development of trust between
humans and robots through the method of developmental robotics. This is inspired
by psychological theories of the developmental emergence of sociocultural skills
and through empirical human-robot interaction experiments. This aim is achieved
through the following research objectives:
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• define a developmental robotics framework for the understanding and predic-
tion of trust interaction between humans and robots;
• conduct HRI experiments validating the role of joint attention, joint action,
imitation and group assimilation in the development of trust, coupled with
embodiment and non-verbal cues;
• design a cognitive architecture for autonomous robots to support and sustain
the building of trust interaction between humans and robots.
This thesis is also part of the collaborative CogNovo Project, funded by the EU
Marie Skłodowska Curie initiative and the University of Plymouth, to foster research
training in the emerging field of Cognitive Innovation. In particular, the study
reported in Chapter 3 was conducted in collaboration with Dr Ilaria Torre, a Cognovo
Research Fellow working on voice features for engagement and trust.
For all the experiments here presented, the codes for the behaviours of the robots
have been produced by Massimiliano Patacchiola as part of the THRIVE Project.
All the codes used can be found in the Github repository https://github.com/
mpatacchiola/naogui/tree/master/tzpgc_2016.
The experiments in Chapter 2, 4, 5 and 6 have been planned, organised, conducted
and supervised by Debora Zanatto as part of the THRIVE Project. The experiment
in Chapter 3 has been jointly planned and conducted by Debora Zanatto and Ilaria






What, then, is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and
anthropomorphisms − in short, a sum of human relations which have
been enhanced, transposed, and embellished poetically and rhetorically,
and which after long use seem firm, canonical, and obligatory to a people:
truths are illusions about which one has forgotten that this is what they
are; metaphors which are worn out and without sensuous power; coins
which have lost their pictures and now matter only as metal, no longer as
coins.




2.1 Can the credibility of human-like robots be trans-
ferred to non-human-like robots?
The following studies provide valuable insight into the range of factors that lead
us to accept a particular nonhuman agent. In particular, the specificity of the
anthropomorphic assignment is examined. If we apply the anthropomorphic status
to a particular agent, do we also extend this human-like status to other exemplars of
the same category of agents? Moreover, if there are variations in the distribution of
anthropomorphic features across the category of agents, might this effect also lead us
to extend human-like status to variants that may lack those features? As an example,
the moon has visual features that approximate a human face which might lead us to
anthropomorphise this particular astronomical body. Given that the moon is likely
to be the first body of this type we would encounter, we may also generalise the
anthropomorphic trait across hereto unseen astronomical bodies? If so, would this
initial encounter increase the probability that we would also assign a human-like
status to encounters with other exemplars of the astronomical body even if, like
Mars, they are lacking the requisite anthropomorphic features? Conversely, if the
first astronomic body we were to view was Mars, would we then be less likely to
anthropomorphise the moon, as we had already categorised astronomical bodies as
being non-human-like?
These potential effects would appear to be related to the concept of stereotype
activation. Stereotypes allow to categorise and simplify the environment (Leyens,
Yzerbyt, & Schadron, 1994) and to associate traits and behaviours to individuals
belonging to a social category (Biernat, Manis, & Nelson, 1991). Stereotype activation
is a useful scaffold when the amount of information is not adequate to form an
impression (Wichman, 2012). People rely on their prior knowledge of a category
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to generalise and extend that stereotype to similar exemplars. This stereotypical
generalisation, like the tendency to anthropomorphise non-human agents, derives
from the innate need of filling the gap between the lack of information about the
agent and the need to portray it and socially define it. Although little is known
about the effect of stereotype activation on non-group members, recent research has
shown that repeated exposure to stereotypes results in greater confidence on those
stereotypes when making evaluations. Arendt, Steindl, and Vitouch (2015) found
evidence of higher facial threat after reading criminal prototypical stories about
dark-skinned strangers. Moreover, Kim-Prieto, Goldstein, Okazaki, and Kirschner
(2010) demonstrated that exposure to American Indians icons increases people’s
willingness to endorse stereotypes about a different racial minority group, like Asian
Americans.
It could be considered that a human-like robot is the epitome of anthropomor-
phism, an explicitly constructed instantiation of anthropomorphic form, behaviour
and function designed to enhance our interaction with and understanding of a highly
obtuse technological agent. Studies have shown that robots can be highly effective
in solicitors of anthropomorphic projection (for a review see Złotowski, Proudfoot,
Yogeeswaran, and Bartneck, 2015). We are inclined to project our own social schemas
onto robots (Fussell et al., 2008), especially when they have human faces or bodies
(DiSalvo, Gemperle, Forlizzi, & Kiesler, 2002) or are engaged in social roles (Fong
et al., 2003). Thus, if a robot has human-like features it is perceived as anthropo-
morphic, it is expected to behave appropriately (Salem, Rohlfing, Kopp, & Joublin,
2011) and follow our social norms (Syrdal, Dautenhahn, Koay, Walters, & Ho, 2013).
Anthropomorphic robots are also perceived as being more intelligent (Bartneck,
Kulić, Croft, & Zoghbi, 2008; Krach et al., 2008), trustworthy (P. A. Hancock et al.,
2011; Waytz, Heafner, & Epley, 2014), likeable (Nass et al., 2000) and attract more
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visual attention (Bae & Kim, 2011) and empathy (Riek, Rabinowitch, Chakrabarti, &
Robinson, 2009b) than their less human-like variants. We even assign personality
traits to the robot based upon idiosyncratic features of their height (Walters, Koay,
Syrdal, Dautenhahn, & Te Boekhorst, 2009), gender features (Powers et al., 2005),
face (Yee, Bailenson, & Rickertsen, 2007) or voice (Nass & Brave, 2005).
The social consequences of anthropomorphism have been widely studied in
marketing by designing human-like features into a product or linguistic inference:
cars are evaluated more highly if they have human facial similarities (Aggarwal
& McGill, 2007), and people gamble more when slot machines are described in
anthropomorphic terms (Kim & McGill, 2011; Riva, Sacchi, & Brambilla, 2015).
If the anthropomorphic status is extended across members of an agent category
then these studies suggest that the status assigned to the first exemplar of the category
should increase the probability that the same status is assigned to subsequently
encountered exemplars. Therefore, if the first exemplar of a new type of agent is
assigned human-like status, then this should prime anthropomorphism in a future
exemplar of similar type and vice versa. The following studies, test this hypothesis
by measuring the behavioural effects of anthropomorphism during interactions
with an agent that has either been primed with a less or more anthropomorphic
initial exemplar. Non-human agents are instantiated by two types of robot, each
conforming to the same broad category of an agent, but with exemplars provoking
different degrees of anthropomorphism based upon their form and behaviour.
2.1.1 Pilot study
In this first study, interactions between the anthropomorphic iCub and less-human-
like Scitos G5 during a price judgement game used by Rau, Li, and Li (2009), have
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been compared (Figure 2.1). Participants were asked to accept price valuations on
common objects provided by the robots. Their willingness to change their own price
judgments to that provided by the robot was taken as the primary measure of the robot
credibility. In the first experiment participants were only asked to interact with the
less-anthropomorphic Scitos G5 robot, to be referred to as the "nonprimed Scitos G5".
In the second experiment, participants first interacted with the anthropomorphic iCub
robot, before repeating the task with the Scitos G5, to be referred to as the "primed
Scitos G5". In addition, to increase the scope of anthropomorphism beyond the
physical form of the robot, a behavioural condition was included in the experiment,
in which robots could engage with participants during the game with either a social
or fixed gaze. The credibility was expected to be higher for the anthropomorphic than
the less anthropomorphic robot. Moreover, interactions using a social gaze should
be more credible than those with a nonsocial fixed gaze. However, if we only apply
our normal social stereotypes to anthropomorphic robots, then it might be surmised
that the benefits of social gaze would only be seen in human-like robots. Finally, the
credibility of the less-anthropomorphic robot should be significantly greater when
interactions with this robot are preceded by interactions with an anthropomorphic
robot.
2.1.2 Method
The participants were asked to select from one of two valuations placed on common
objects presented by a robotic compatriot. After a selection was made, the robot would
voice its agreement or disagreement with the selected price and, if the participants
did not agree with it, give them the chance to change their decision so that it would
conform to its own. The willingness of participants to change their judgement was
taken as a measure of the robot credibility. This task was used to examine how the
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Fig. 2.1 iCub (left) and Scitos G5 (right) robots
form and behaviour of the robot would affect their perceived credibility, and whether
their initial experiences with a particular robot would prime their future interactions
with a different type of robot. In the first experiment participants interacted only
with Scitos G5. In the second experiment, each participant made a separate series
of price judgement interactions first with iCub and then immediately repeated the
game with Scitos G5. These robots could also be programmed to behave with either
a social gaze or non-social gaze during their interactions.
Participants
Thirty participants (8 males, 15 females) between 18 and 30 years (mean age = 21.76
years, SD = 2.80 years) participated in the study.
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Apparatus
The objects for the price judgment game were chosen after a screening test. Twenty
participants have been asked to judge the price of 80 commonly used objects, with
44 of these selected as stimuli for the experiment. Half of the stimuli were selected
on the basis that participants would be uncertain how much they would cost, as
demonstrated by a relatively high variance between the price judgements (SD =
4.61). The remaining half of the stimuli had low price-judgement variance (SD =
0.69), meaning that the prices of these objects should be well known to participants.
Stimuli from these two categories were equally split for application with either the
Scitos G5 or iCub robots. Statistical comparisons of the price variance for the objects
used with the two robots showed no significant differences for high (t(20) = 0.599, p
= .555) or low (t(20) = 0.359, p = .722) price variance objects. The same voice was
used for both robots.
Procedure
The participants were seated at the same height as the robot, facing each other over
a common table. In the preparatory phase of the experiment, a series of objects were
placed on the table by the experimenter. For each object, the participants were asked
to provide a description and two potential prices to the robot, which would then
respond with a preference for one of the prices. After this preference was made, the
participants were asked to provide final feedback on whether they thought the price
selected by the robot was correct. In this phase, the description, the price alternative,
and correct price for the objects were provided to the participants on a written sheet.
This part of the experiment was designed to provide familiarisation with the main
task, where the robot and participants roles were reversed.
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In the main task, an experimenter would place the stimulus object on the table and
the robot would provide a brief verbal description of it, followed by two prices. The
participants then had to make a choice between the two prices offered by the robot,
after which the robot would give positive or negative feedback on their selection.
For the positive feedback, the robot used to say "I agree with you" while nodding its
head. For the negative one, the robot used to say "I do not agree", while shaking its
head. If the robot had given negative feedback, the participants were asked whether
they wanted to change choice to agree with the robot, saying "Do you want to change
your choice?". During this part of the experiment, the robot could perform two
different gaze behaviours (social and nonsocial). In the social gaze behaviour, the
robot looked first at the object on the table and before starting describing the object,
moved its gaze to the participants. In the nonsocial gaze behaviour, the robot gaze
was fixed at the stimulus.
All participants were presented to the same predefined script of robot responses
to the objects, which made no account of their own choice in the game. Participants
completed 22 trials per robot.
2.1.3 Results
Social interaction with the robot was quantified through analysis of trials in which the
robot disagreed with the price choice of the participants. A change rate was calculated
as the proportion of the trials where the participants changed their selection to agree
with the robot, compared to those in which they stuck with their original decision.
Change rates for iCub and the primed and nonprimed presentations of G5 are shown
in Figure 2.2, presented for both the social and nonsocial gaze conditions.
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A forward stepwise linear mixed-effects model was fitted to the data, with change
rate as dependent variable, robot (nonprimed Scitos G5, primed Scitos G5 and
iCub) and gaze behaviour (social and nonsocial) as independent variables, and
with participants as a random factor. Bonferroni’s corrections were applied, when
required. The overall effect size of the model was r2 = 0.55.
The model showed a significant main effect of the robot (χ2(2) = 7.79,p = .020).
Post hoc comparisons showed higher change rate for the primed Scitos G5 when
compared with its nonprimed version (p = .004). Nonprimed Scitos G5 reported
a lower change rate than iCub (p = .009), while no differences have been found
between iCub and the primed Scitos G5 (p > .050). Gaze had no effect on the
change rate (p > .050), but there was a significant interaction between robot and gaze
(χ2(3) = 11.51,p = .009). Post hoc testing revealed that the change rate was significantly
higher (p = .025) in the social than the nonsocial gaze condition for the iCub robot.






















Similarly to previous findings (Fink, 2012), results from this pilot study indicate
that people get more socially engaged with robots when they are more human-like.
Participants were more likely to change their valuations to agree with the human-like
iCub robot than with the less anthropomorphic Scitos G5 when that robot was
presented in isolation. Moreover, the change rate increased when the iCub engaged
in a more human-like social gaze behaviour, compared to the use of a fixed gaze.
Conversely, this social gaze behaviour had no effect on interactions with the Scitos
G5, where the change rate was not significantly different from the use of a fixed
gaze. This would suggest that the credibility of anthropomorphic robots benefits
from the automatic activation of social stereotypes that are normally absent during
interactions with less-anthropomorphic variants.
However, once humans have experience of an anthropomorphic robot, they
seem to extend this classification, and the associated social benefits, to subsequent
interactions with a less human-like robot. Participants’ change rate with the Scitos
G5, in fact, was significantly higher if participants had first interacted with the
iCub robot. Also, once the less human-like Scitos G5 had been presented after the
anthropomorphic iCub, there was no longer difference in change rate between these
two robots. It should be noted, however, that even after encountering iCub, Scitos
G5 did not benefit from the use of social gaze. This could be due to the lack of
congruence between gaze behaviour and robot physical form.
These findings have important consequences for the credibility of robots and
their acceptance, e.g. in the increasing need and advocacy for the use of robots to
assist the elderly in their homes (Burgoon et al., 2000). However, the functionality
required in this environment often precludes the use of anthropomorphic physical
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forms, which hinders acceptance (Broadbent, Stafford, & MacDonald, 2009). This
study suggests that if users are first exposed to anthropomorphic robots, they could
be more accepting of their less human-like, but more functional, robotic relations.
2.2 Generalisation of Anthropomorphic Stereotype
On the bases of the previous results, a new study has been conducted to test the
replicability and reliability of the pilot. Interactions with NAO, a humanoid robot
widely used in social robotics (Kuchenbrandt, Eyssel, Bobinger, & Neufeld, 2011),
have been compared with Baxter, an industrial development robot (Freire, Barreto,
Veloso, & Varela, 2009). Participants socially engaged with these two robots using
the previous price judgement task developed by Rau et al. (2009) and gaze and joint
attention were manipulated like in the pilot study.
The aim of this experiment was to examine if attributions of anthropomorphism
are specific to an encountered non-human agent, or whether they were also gen-
eralised across other members of that agent type. While half of the participants
played the price judgement game with the NAO robot first and the Baxter robot
second, this order was reversed for the remaining participants. According to the
previous hypotheses, the credibility of the Baxter robot should be higher when it is
presented second, after participants have played with the NAO robot, than when
it is presented first. Conversely, the credibility of the NAO robot should be lower
when it is presented second, following interactions with the Baxter, than when it is
presented first. Similar comparisons were also made for the gaze behaviour of the
robots, comparing the use of a more anthropomorphic joint attention to a condition





Each participant made a separate series of price judgement interactions with two
different types of robot, the human-like NAO or non-anthropomorphic Baxter robot.
These robots could also be programmed to behave with either a social gaze or
non-social gaze during their interactions.
Participants
Thirty participants (5 males, 25 females) between 18 and 30 years (mean age = 23.20
years, SD = 2.10 years), recruited from the School of Psychology of the University
of Plymouth, participated at the study. The sample size was based on Rau et al.
(2009) from which the task has been selected. Moreover, G Power 3.1 Faul, Erdfelder,
Buchner, and Lang (2009) was used to determine that a sample size of twenty-five
participants would provide 80% statistical power for detecting a medium-sized
effect equivalent to what we observed in the previous study (r2 = 0.54), assuming a
two-tailed t-test and an alpha level of 0.05. Familiarity or any previous experience
with robots was the main exclusion criteria, which was assessed during the recruiting
phase. Participants were naïve as to the purpose of the investigation and gave
informed written consent to participate in the study.
Apparatus
The NAO (Figure 2.3) is a small (57cm in height) humanoid robot widely used to
study robot-human relations and is specifically designed to be both expressive and
approachable and has been shown to stimulate social skills with Autistic children
(Shamsuddin et al., 2012). Conversely, Baxter (Figure 2.3), although having two arms
and a simple animated face, is an industrial robot designed for the study of HRC in
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tasks such as assembling and handling operations, as well as acting as monitoring
for workers safety.
Fig. 2.3 NAO robot (foreground) and Baxter robot (background)
The same objects of the previous experiment have been used. The same voice
was used for both robots. All the participants interacted with both Baxter and NAO
robots, with the order of presentation counterbalanced between participants.
Questionnaires were used as secondary measures to the main experiment task.
Three short scales measured Likeability, Trust and Credibility. The Likeability
Questionnaire was based on Reysen (2005); the Trust scale was an adaptation of the
Receptivity/Trust subscale of the Relational Communication Questionnaire and of
the selection of Trust items in the IPIP International Personality Item Pool (Goldberg
et al., 2006). The Credibility scale was based on McCroskey and Young (1981) Source
Credibility Scale. Finally, Bartneck, Kulic, Croft and Zoghbi (2008) questionnaire was
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used to measure a range of HRI factors (Anthropomorphism, Animacy, Likeability,
Perceived Intelligence and Perceived Safety).
Procedure
The procedure was identical to the pilot study. All participants were presented to
the same predefined script of robot responses to the objects, which made no account
of their own choice in the game. All participants completed 22 trials, after which
they were asked to complete the battery of questionnaires.
The experiment was counterbalanced in a 2 (gaze behaviour: social or nonsocial)




A forward stepwise linear mixed-effects model was fitted to the data, with change-
rate as the dependent variable, robot (NAO and Baxter), order (first or second robot
presented) and gaze behaviour (social and nonsocial) as independent variables, and
with participants as a random factor. Bonferroni’s corrections were applied, when
required. The overall effect size of the model was r2 = 0.46.
The model showed no significant main effects (ps > .05), but there was a sig-
nificant interaction between robot and order (χ2(3) = 10.93,p = .012). Post hoc com-
parisons(Figure 2.4) revealed a higher change rate for Baxter when participants
interacted with it after the NAO robot than when they interacted with it first (p= .010).
Conversely, for the NAO robot, change rate was lower when participants interacted
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Fig. 2.4 Change rate for Baxter and NAO robots in their first and second presentation.
with it after the Baxter robot (p = .047). A comparison between robots in their
first presentation also revealed that the NAO had a higher change rate than Baxter
(p = .003).
A significant interaction between robot and gaze behaviour (χ2(2) = 14.77,p < .001)
revealed a higher change rate for the NAO robot when showing social gaze (p = .036).
For Baxter robot, gaze behaviour had no effect on change-rate (p > .05).
The three-way interaction between robot, order and gaze was also found to
be significant (χ2(2) = 11.83,p = .003). Post-hoc comparisons, assessed using t-tests
(Figure 2.5) , showed a significant effect of gaze only with the NAO robot, and then
only when the NAO was the first robot encountered by the participants (p = .001). In
this particular case, social gaze increased the change rate. None of the other pairwise



















Fig. 2.5 Effect of gaze behaviour on change rate for both robots (NAO and Baxter.
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Questionnaires results











Table 2.2 Questionnaires analysis results
Order Robot Order by Robot
Likeability n.s. X2(1) = 25.24,p < .001 X
2
(2) = 12.15,p = .002
Trust n.s. X2(1) = 14.18,p < .001 n.s.
Credibility n.s. n.s. n.s.
Godspeed Questionnaires
Anthropomorphism n.s. X2(1) = 25.22,p < .001 X
2
(2) = 6.52,p = .038
Animacy n.s. X2(1) = 28.86,p < .001 X
2
(2) = 7.76,p = .021
Likeability n.s. X2(1) = 29.65,p < .001 X
2
(2) = 7.19,p = .027
Intelligence n.s. n.s. n.s.
Safety n.s. X2(1) = 5.55,p = .018 n.s.
For each questionnaire, a linear mixed-effects model was fitted to the data, with
each scale as the dependent measure, robot (NAO and Baxter) and order (first or
second robot presented) as independent variables, and with participants as a random
factor (Table 2.2).
Participants preferred the NAO robot in all scales, with the exception for Cred-














































Fig. 2.6 Participants’ ratings for Baxter and NAO robots in their first and second presentation
for Likeability (Panel A), Anthropomorphism (Panel B) and Animacy (Panel C) scales.
teraction between order and robot showed that when presented after the more
anthropomorphic NAO robot, Baxter had significantly higher ratings for Likeability,
Anthropomorphism and Animacy scales than when it was presented first (ps < .050)
(Figure 2.6). For the NAO robot, there was no significant effect of order for any of
the questionnaire scales (ps > .050).
2.2.4 Discussion
This study sought to understand one of the fundamental psychological properties
of anthropomorphic projection, its specificity. When we anthropomorphise a non-
human agent, we ask whether the assignment of that trait is strictly limited to that
particular agent, or can also be generalised across other exemplars of the same
type. Importantly, if there are variations in the distribution of the anthropomorphic
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features across a particular type of agent, will this category effect lead to us follow
exemplars that are missing the requisite features? It has been contended that the
prior activation of a stereotype affects overt behaviour in a later encounter. This
hypothesis has been tested by exploring whether prior experience with a humanoid
NAO robot would increase the credibility and anthropomorphism of a subsequently
encountered Baxter robot, an industrial robot lacking many of the anthropomorphic
features of the NAO. Importantly, if this was an effect of stereotype generalisation,
then also the reverse effect should be found if the first encounter was with Baxter
robot.
Results showed that the human-like form of the NAO robot increased the
credibility of the Baxter robot, leading participants to associate a range of human-like
traits and linked behaviours to it. Data from questionnaires showed that participants
rated the NAO robot as being more anthropomorphic than the Baxter robot, also
rating it as being significantly more likeable, trustworthy, safe, and with greater
animacy. However, no significant main effect between these robots has been found
in the primary measure, that of change rate. This was the proportion of trials where
participants changed their valuation of common objects to conform to the judgement
of the robot, an implicit measure of the credibility of the robot. This provided an
indirect measure of the degree of anthropomorphism associated with the robot, as
it has been well established that human-like robots are perceived as more credible
than less human-like variants (DiSalvo et al., 2002; P. A. Hancock et al., 2011; Waytz
et al., 2014). Instead, the cross-over interaction between order and robot satisfied
the initial hypothesis. That is, the Baxter robot was perceived as being significantly
more credible when participants interacted with it after the NAO robot. Conversely,
the NAO robot was perceived as being more credible when participants interacted
with it first, rather than after the Baxter. The questionnaire data also showed that
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experience with the NAO had a humanising effect on the Baxter, leading participants
to rate Baxter higher for anthropomorphism, likeability, and animacy. However,
the questionnaires data for the NAO robot were not significantly affected by prior
experience with Baxter. This disparity between an implicit measure of credibility
seen in the change rate of the NAO and the explicit post hoc rating provided by
participants in the questionnaire is not unusual (Hofmann, Gawronski, Gschwendner,
Le, & Schmitt, 2005). However, it does highlight the importance of implicit measures
in the field of HRI where questionnaires, which may not always be sensitive to
conceptual correspondence, are often the primary or sole source of behavioural data.
These results can be considered a reliable replication of the previous pilot
experiment (Section 2.2.2). However, it should be considered that in both studies the
role of the anthropomorphic agent was played by two robots that did not completely
embed human-like features. iCub was built to resemble a 4 years old child, thus
the change rate could be affected by the perception of low competence that a 4
years old child would have in this type of task. On the other hand, the reduced
size of the NAO robot could lead participants to perceive it more as a toy than a
competent agent. Considering this, results should be cautiously weighted and future
research should further investigate this facilitation effect with a more adult-like
type of anthropomorphic robots. Lastly, future research should also investigate
the potential extension of this effect by using a human model. If the exposure
to an anthropomorphic agent increases the credibility of a less human-like robot,
will a first interaction with a human increase our willingness to accept a robot
suggestion? Following evidence on human-based research, it could be assumed that
prior positive experience will increase the chance of having a subsequent profitable
interaction. However, considering that the anthropomorphic robots used in these
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studies were lacking some proper adult-like features, further studies are essential to
better understand this effect.
In addition to the study of anthropomorphic cues inherent to the form of the
robots, the effect of human-like behaviour on the credibility of the robots was
also examined. Both NAO and Baxter robots could engage in social or nonsocial
gaze behaviour during the valuation task: moving their heads to engage in joint
attention when discussing the valued object, or simply staring fixedly ahead. As
this behaviour is orthogonal to the form of the robot, it also helps to investigate
interactions between anthropomorphic cues related to form and behaviour. Results
showed that the effect of social gaze on credibility was limited to the NAO robot,
and only when it had not been preceded by the Baxter. This interaction is in
line with previous findings demonstrating that social gaze was only a human-like
prerogative (Zanatto, Patacchiola, Goslin, & Cangelosi, 2016) and did not provide an
effective anthropomorphic cue; otherwise, it should have had an effect similar to
that of form. Rather, social gaze was only effective if participants had assigned a
human-like status to a robot. This is consistent with the activation of behavioural
representations (Dijksterhuis & Van Knippenberg, 1998) or cognitive structures
relating to interpersonal interactions (Baldwin, Carrell, & Lopez, 1990), characteristic
of the human-like trait. Other studies have shown that behaviour and interaction
can be a more important cue to humanlike status than form (Kahn Jr et al., 2007;
Kiesler & Goetz, 2002). However, these results might be consistent with Guthrie’s
psychological explanation of anthropomorphic projection (Guthrie & Guthrie, 1993).
In contrast to the induction-based explanation provided by Epley et al. (2007),
Guthrie contends that anthropomorphism is not the result of our desire for simplified
representation. Rather, it is the result of our seeking to project the most complex
possible organisation onto any stimulus. As living intentional beings offer the
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greatest complexity, we seek to assign these properties onto an unknown agent as
long as its features do not directly exclude them. If intentional social interactions,
such as joint attention, were at a higher level of complexity than anthropomorphic
form, any agent that violated the requirements of form would also exclude this
higher level of attribution.
2.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, it has been shown that our anthropomorphic attribution to an agent,
either as human or non-human, can potentially affect credibility in subsequent
encounters with similar agents. This stereotype activation means that our initial attri-
butions can to be generalised to other variants of a similar type, even if they possess
features that may be incongruent with that initial attribution. This extension of our
understanding of the psychology of anthropomorphism has a growing application
in the field of HRI. While robots are increasingly used in the manufacturing industry
and have wide portrayal in the media (Bartneck, 2013), our own personal interac-
tions with robots are extremely limited. This means that, for most of us, our first
interaction with robots lies in the future, as does our potential anthropomorphism of
these complex machines. Both the benefits and problems of anthropomorphism are
particularly acute in robots, where familiarity (Choi & Kim, 2009) and believability
(Tapus, Mataric, & Scassellati, 2007) are keys to our acceptance of robots. Acceptance
is a particular problem in health and adult social care, where robotic assistance has
great potential in the care of the elderly (Broadbent et al., 2009). Unfortunately, in
this application, as in many others, the physical or technological constraints dictated
by the required functions of a robot, are often not compatible with a humanoid form.
However, these two studies show that if the experience of more practical robots
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could be preceded with more human-like robots, then we would be more accepting
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This chapter provides a valuable insight into the development of trust between
humans and robots and the role of anthropomorphism in increasing or reducing
trust.
Although an individual’s propensity and personal history can initially affect trust,
its development and persistence over time depend on the quality of the interaction
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with others (Asch, 1946). Trust relies on social interaction, thus the capability of
expressing and understanding intentions importantly affects it (McCabe, Rigdon, &
Smith, 2003), and verbal and non-verbal communication both play a role. In this
chapter, voice and joint attention have been investigated as communicative factors
affecting trust in HRI. Burgoon, Birk, and Pfau (1990), in fact, in examining the
communicative cues affecting persuasion and credibility in interaction, indicated
vocal (e.g. fluency and pitch) kinesic and proxemic (e.g. eye contact, smiling,
gestures) features as the most impactful elements.
The investment game, a methodology derived from game theory, has been used
to test implicit trust attributions to a NAO robot over time. Specifically, the money
that participants invested in the robot has been defined as the implicit measure of
trust (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995; Camerer, 2011; Van‘t Wout & Sanfey, 2008).
The independent variables consisted of the manipulation of three characteristics
of the robotic agent – voice, attention and behaviour – in order to measure how
anthropomorphic perception and experience influence trusting behaviour. The robot
voice was either natural or synthetic, the attention was either joint or nonjoint and
the behaviour was either generous (high payoff) or mean (low payoff). A summary
of the robot manipulations can be found in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1 The 8 robot manipulation conditions.
Voice Attention Behaviour
1 Natural Joint Generous
2 Natural Joint Mean
3 Natural Non joint Generous
4 Natural Non joint Mean
5 Synthetic Joint Generous
6 Synthetic Joint Mean
7 Synthetic Non joint Generous
8 Synthetic Non joint Mean
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Previous research on vocal features showed that being able to speak (either with
a synthetic or a natural voice) was enough for a robot to be treated as a competent
agent (Sims et al., 2009). Nass, Steuer, and Tauber (1994) demonstrated that people
apply to machine voices the same conversational and interactional rules that they
would use with a human. Moreover, the sound of the voice itself was enough to
make personality judgments, regardless of the speech content (Nass & Lee, 2001).
Nass and Brave (2005) also found that male and female interactants reacted in the
same way to natural and synthetic voices in a choice-making task, provided the
voice corresponded to their gender.
When it comes to designing such a robot’s voice, the question of whether to
use a natural or synthetic voice arises. Would people prefer a ‘congruent’ robot,
which approaches humanness in all its characteristics, but does not quite reach it?
Or would people prefer an ‘incongruent’ robot, with a pre-recorded human voice,
for the sake of clarity and familiarity?
Interestingly, W. J. Mitchell et al. (2011) demonstrated that a cross-modal mismatch
in human voice realism can arise a feeling of uncertainty when seeing a robot. They
found that a robot with a human voice, or a human being with a synthetic voice,
were perceived as eerier than a robot with a synthetic voice or a human being
with a human voice. Following these results, people might be expected to prefer a
mechanical and synthesised voice over a human and natural one. Specifically, in this
experiment, higher investments on the synthetic voice than the natural one were
hypothesised.
From a nonverbal point of view, joint attention also has been found to influence
participants’ decisions in HRI tasks (Mutlu, Shiwa, Kanda, Ishiguro, & Hagita,
2009; Staudte & Crocker, 2011). By briefly moving their eyes, robots could affect
the decision-making process, even when people do not report seeing those cues
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(Admoni, Bank, Tan, Toneva, & Scassellati, 2011). Gaze and joint attention also
influence a person’s perception, even in terms of trust (Bayliss & Tipper, 2006; Mason,
Tatkow, & Macrae, 2005; Staudte & Crocker, 2011). Moreover, Zanatto et al. (2016)
reported that gaze only helped HRC if the robot was humanoid. Given this evidence,
the current experiment could help to clarify whether the manipulation of a robot
gaze and attention engagement would affect users’ implicit trust attributions as
well. Specifically, during the investment game, both joint and nonjoint attentional
behaviours have been compared to establish which level of interactivity can increase
trust in HRI, hypothesising a beneficial effect of gaze and pointing on it. That is,
participants were expected to increase their investments in a more engaging robot
that a static one.
The controversial results above mentioned on the level of verbal and nonverbal
behaviours in affecting HRI, arise the question of how much anthropomorphism
is necessary to produce a satisfying interaction between humans and robot. Al-
though anthropomorphism is generally considered a facilitator in HRI, literature
has demonstrated that under specific critical conditions people would prefer a
less anthropomorphic robot (Section 1.5.1). Moreover, previous experiments using
the Investment Game, reported a connection between the payoff and the vocal
features of the players, for which high payoffs increased trust in an SSBE-accented
(Standard Southern British English) player, and low payoffs increased trust in a
Birmingham-accented player (Torre, Goslin, & White, 2015).
For these reasons, in this study, the type of payoff has been manipulated, by
having participants engaging in a game with a more or less profitable outcome.
Participants could face a generous robot, always repaying economic trust with a nice
amount of money, or a mean robot showing the selfish tendency of not returning
enough money to establish a cooperative trustworthy exchange. Following the
52
3.1 Introduction
literature, participants were expected to prefer a more anthropomorphic robot when
playing with a mean robot, while for participants engaging in a game with a generous
robot, higher preference for a static and machine-like robot was hypothesised. More
specifically, for a mean robot, higher investments in a natural voice and joint attention
behaviours were expected. On the opposite, when generously rewarded, participants
were expected to maintain trust in a mechanical type of voice and a non-interactive
robot. The mean attitude of the robot has been considered as an extension of
intentional behaviour. Specifically, it has been used to understand how humans
face a non-human entity that shows intention. This would help in understanding
whether people can apply to machine human-human social mechanisms. Literature
has demonstrated that unexpected behaviours coming from a robot lead to higher
anthropomorphisation. In the same way, a mean behaviour can be categorised as an
unusual and unexpected attitude in a robot. In this sense, the mean behaviour has not
been built as a potential future feature that a robot could embed but has been used to
further understand how people react and respond to this kind of behaviours in robots.
If we want to fully understand how HRI works, we need to investigate any potential
scenarios. Once we know whether in certain conditions a more anthropomorphic
behaviour could increase the chances of a profitable interaction, we know how to
build a robot that can efficiently face that situation.
3.1.1 Contributions
This experiment has been partially supported by CogNovo (FP7-PEOPLE-2013-ITN-
604764), a project funded by the EU Marie Curie programme.
The researchers involved in the study and their contributions are listed below:
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• Debora Zanatto contributed to the ideation and creation of attentional stimuli
(gaze engagement and pointing behaviour), the design of the display (see
Figure 3.2), the creation of the scripts for the behaviours of the robots (including
also the payoff, which can be found in Appendix A), testing and the statistical
analyses here reported.
• Ilaria Torre contributed to the ideation and creation of vocal stimuli (natural
voice recordings and resyntheses; the list of the sentences used can be found in
Appendix B), the design of the display (see Figure 3.2), and testing.
• Massimiliano Patacchiola contributed to the programming of the robots and
coordinated the synchronization of the robots and the gaming device.
3.2 Method
3.2.1 Participants
One hundred twenty-two individuals (82 female and 40 male; mean age = 23.12
years, SD = 8.62 years) participated in the study. All participants were native British
English speakers, they were right-handed, reported normal hearing and no language
or neurological impairments. Familiarity or any previous experience with robots
was the main exclusion criteria, which was assessed during the recruiting phase.
Participants were naïve as to the purpose of the investigation and gave informed





Participants were seated in front of a NAO robot, with a touchscreen monitor
standing between the two (Figure 3.1). They were told that the goal of the game
was to earn as much money as possible and that mutual cooperation with the robot
would lead to greater profit. Each participant started with a notional sum of 10
Experimental Currency Units (ECU) at the beginning of each round of the game.
Each round proceeded as follow: the participants heard a previously recorded
utterance, played from the robot speakers; then they indicated how much, if any,
of the 10 ECU they wished to invest, by tapping a number on the monitor (e.g.
participant invested 5 ECU); the robot then received 3 times the invested amount
(e.g. 5*3 = 15 ECU). By following a fixed script, the robot returned a percentage of
that sum back to the participants (e.g. 15 * 0.3 = 4.50 ECU).
Fig. 3.1 Investment Game setup.
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The robot was programmed to apply two different types of payoff, namely
generous and mean. For the generous condition, the robot could return between
50 % to 80 % of the tripled amount. For the mean condition instead, the robot could
return between 0 % and 30 % of the received amount. These percentages changed at
each round but were fixed between games.
Before the game started, the participants engaged in 3 practice rounds with
the experimenter, in order to familiarise with the interface. The display had 11
numbered touch-screen buttons on the side of the participants, which they could
press to indicate the amount of money to invest in each round (from 0 to 10). On the
robot side, there was an orange slider, which was used to give a visual representation
of how much money the robot was returning. The starting position of the slider was
always at its midpoint, as can be seen in Figure 3.2. The slider then moved according
Fig. 3.2 Investment Game display
to the percentage of the robot returns: it moved to the left of the participants when
the robot returned more money than they invested and to the right when it returned
less money. The computer screen displayed also all the monetary transactions in
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real time, including the amount that the robot returned to the participants and the
total money accumulated round after round. The ‘bank’ button showed the sum of
money that participants had earned in all the previous rounds. The buttons at the
top of the screen showed how much money the robot had received and returned.
The display was aligned to the participants’ visual, to ensure ease of understanding.
Participants engaged in two games of 20 rounds each with two equally looking
NAO robots. The number of rounds was not known to the participants. The total
amount that participants earned at the end of each game was converted to British
Pounds, at a rate of 30 ECU = £0.10 and the sum of what they earned in the two
games was paid to them before they left. A set of questionnaires was filled at the
end of each game. After playing two games and completing the questionnaires,
participants were debriefed and paid.
The robot voice and attention were manipulated during the game. In terms of
voice, the robot had either a natural, pre-recorded female British English voice or a
synthetic voice obtained from the resyntheses of the same British voice. Moreover,
voices were recorded from two different speakers.
In terms of attention, the robot arm and head movements were manipulated.
In the joint attention condition, the robot followed the participants’ movements,
giving an impression of looking at the participant. When it was the robot turn in the
game, it lowered its head, ‘looking’ at the screen, and performed a sweeping arm
movement, congruent with the slider direction.
In the nonjoint attention condition, instead, the robot was standing still with
its head lowered, and never looked at the participants, thus giving the impression
that it was always looking at the screen. A detailed timeline of all the behaviours
performed by the robot is shown in Figure 3.3.
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Fig. 3.3 Experimental Timeline for joint and nonjoint attention conditions.
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The experiment was counterbalanced in a 2 (attention: joint or nonjoint) by 2
(speaker: 1 or 2) within-subject design and a 2 (behaviour: generous or mean) by 2
(voice: natural or synthetic) between-subject design.
Questionnaires
Four questionnaires were used as secondary measures to the main game task.
Three short scales measured likeability, trust, and credibility (Goldberg et al., 2006;
McCroskey & Young, 1981; Reysen, 2005). In addition, a questionnaire from Bartneck
et al. (2008) was used to measure a range of HRI factors (anthropomorphism, animacy,
likeability, perceived intelligence and perceived safety). Participants filled in the
questionnaires after the first investment game ended and again after the second
investment game ended.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Investment game results
Two participants did not follow the instructions during the experiment and were
excluded from the data analysis. A linear mixed-effects model was fitted to the
data using backward stepwise selection, with investment as dependent variable,
behaviour (generous/mean), voice (natural/synthetic), attention (joint/nonjoint),
speaker (1/2) and game turn (the 20 rounds of the game) as independent variables,
and participants id as random factor. The overall effect size of the model was r2 = 0.51.
Post-hoc comparisons were assessed using t-tests and Bonferroni’s correction was
applied, when needed.
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There was a main effect of behaviour (χ2(1) = 163.17,p < .001) with higher invest-
ments in the generous condition (mean = 8.13 ECU) than in the mean condition
(mean = 4.6 ECU), as can be seen from Figure 3.4. There was also a main effect of the
game turn (χ2(1) = 13.02,p < .001), with overall higher investments in the second half
of the game. There was no effect of attention, voice and speaker (ps > .05).
A significant two-way interaction between behaviour and game turn has been
found (χ2(1) = 61.05,p < .001). Post hoc analyses revealed a game turn effect for
generous condition (χ2(1) = 267.47,p < .001), for which investments increased over




















Fig. 3.4 Average investment in the generous (top) and mean (bottom) conditions.
A significant two-way interaction between voice and game turn has been found
(χ2(1) = 7.44,p = .006). Post hoc analyses revealed a game turn effect for both voices
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(natural χ2(1) = 73.83,p < .001; synthetic χ
2
(1) = 28.26,p < .001 Figure 3.5). Participants
invested more money in the synthetic voice in the first half of the game. However,
















Fig. 3.5 Average investments in the two voice conditions over time.
The significant two-way interaction between voice and behaviour (χ2(2) = 6.63,p =
.036) showed that participants in the generous condition preferred to invest in a
synthetic voice over a natural one (p < .001). No other significant differences have
been found (ps > .05).
There was also a significant three-way interaction between behaviour, voice and
game turn (χ2(1) = 18.84,p < .001). A post hoc mixed-effects model was fitted to the
generous and mean data separately to analyse this interaction. The investment was
the dependent variable, game turn and voice were predictors, and participants id
was the random factor. In the generous condition, there were a main effect of game
turn (χ2(1) = 269.44,p < .001) and a main effect of voice (χ
2
(1) = 4.18,p = .041), but no
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significant interaction between the two factors has been found (p > .05). As can
be seen from the bottom panel in Figure 3.6, investments increased over time and
were higher in the synthetic voice condition. In the mean condition, there were no
effect for game turn and voice, but there was a significant interaction between game
turn and voice (χ2(1) = 16.17,p < .001). As shown in the bottom panel of Figure 3.6,






















Fig. 3.6 Average investments in the two different voice conditions and in the mean (top) and
generous (bottom) behaviour conditions over time.
A significant two-way interaction between game turn and attention was also
found (χ2(1) = 7.80,p = .005). Post hoc analyses revealed a game turn effect for
both attention conditions (joint χ2(1) = 84.95,p < .001, nonjoint χ
2
(1) = 27.13,p < .001).
Participants invested more money in the second half of the game in both attention

















Fig. 3.7 Average investments in the two attention conditions over time.
Finally, a significant interaction between behaviour and attention confirmed
the main behaviour effect (X2(2) = 6.37,p = .041). For both attention conditions, the
generous behaviour received higher investments over the mean one (ps < .001).
3.3.2 Questionnaires Results
For all the scales, a linear mixed-effects model was fitted to the data, with behaviour
(generous/mean), voice (natural/synthetic), speaker and attention (joint/nonjoint) as
independent variables, and participants id as a random factor. Post-hoc comparisons
were assessed using t-tests and Bonferroni’s correction was applied, when needed. As
shown in Table 3.3, behaviour affected Trust, Credibility, Likeability and Intelligence
scales, with higher ratings for the generous robot. Attention affected all the scales,
showing higher scores for the joint attention condition. Voice had no effect. Speaker
affected Credibility with higher ratings for speaker 2 than speaker 1.
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Table 3.3 Main effects of questionnaires.
Behaviour Attention Voice Speaker
Likeability n.s., χ2(1) = 12.76,p < .001 n.s. n.s.
Trust χ2(1) = 46.45,p < .001 χ
2
(1) = 25.75,p < .001 n.s. n.s.
Credibility χ2(1) = 47.74,p < .001 χ
2
(1) = 14.83,p < .001 n.s. χ
2
(1) = 4.36,p = .037
Godspeed Questionnaires
Anthropomorphism n.s. χ2(1) = 30.00,p < .001 n.s. n.s.
Animacy n.s. χ2(1) = 59.94,p < .001 n.s. n.s.
Likeability χ2(1) = 62.63,p < .001 χ
2
(1) = 12.57,p < .001 n.s. n.s.
Intelligence χ2(1) = 15.62,p < .001 χ
2
(1) = 5.46,p = .019 n.s. n.s.
Safety n.s. χ2(1) = 7.04,p = .008 n.s. n.s.
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Both Likeability scales showed a significant two-way interaction between be-
haviour and voice (χ2(2) = 9.19,p = .010; χ
2
(2) = 6.64,p = .036), with higher ratings for
the synthetic voice in the generous behaviour condition (ps > .05), and for the natural
voice in the mean behaviour condition (ps > .05).
Mean Generous

























Fig. 3.8 Likeability ratings for natural and synthetic voices in the mean and generous
conditions (panel A). Safety ratings for joint and nonjoint attention in the mean and generous
conditions (panel B)
For Safety, a two-way interaction between behaviour and attention emerged
(χ2(2) = 7.52,p = .023). The joint attention condition was perceived as safer than
the nonjoint in the generous behaviour condition (p = .035), but no differences for
attention were found in the mean behaviour condition (p > .05). Moreover, for Safety,
the three-way interaction between behaviour, voice and attention was also significant
(χ2(4) = 12.20,p = .016). Voice had an effect in the generous and nonjoint attention
condition (p = .015), with lower ratings for natural voice. All the other comparisons
were not significant (ps > .05).
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3.4 Discussion
This study aimed at establishing trust between humans and robots, by measuring
the potential effect of verbal and nonverbal cues as anthropomorphic features. In
an iterative investment game, participants could choose the amount of money to
invest in a robot showing different degrees of anthropomorphism. This has been
manipulated in terms of voice (synthetic or natural) and attentional skills (showing
joint attention engagement or not). Moreover, the payoff, as a variable affecting trust
over time, has been included so that the robot could show a generous or a mean
attitude in returning money to the participants.
Participants invested consistently more money in a generous robot, in a robot
with a synthetic voice and in a robot performing joint attentional behaviours.
Participants were susceptible to the robot payoff; they responded with higher
investments to a generous robot, while reduced their monetary endowment to a
mean agent. Higher investments with a generous game partner were expected,
as the goal of the participants was ultimately to earn more money, and as such,
they learned very quickly if the partner was being trustworthy or not. This type of
behaviour follows HHI rules, thus it could be argued that participants in this study
ascribed intentionality to the robot investment choices, whereas a low payoffwas not
categorised as a mistake in following the game rules. This was further confirmed by
the analyses of the questionnaires, in which participants’ ratings varied on the basis
of the robot payoff. Furthermore, this effect could also be interpreted in terms of
commitment (Powell & Michael, 2019). As the robot in the generous condition, kept
returning a consistent amount of money, it is plausible that participants felt motivated
to keep investing also as a way to repay the trust. The sense of commitment implies
that the two parties expect the other will fulfil his/her obligation and will remain
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engaged until the final joint goal is reached. Here, participants might have felt
engaged in maintaining a high level of trust in the generous robot, in order to fulfil
the robot expectations. This hypothesis is supported by Michael’s theorisation on
the sense of commitment in HRI. As the authors stated "even if a human agent
does not explicitly believe that a robot can make commitments, or that she herself
owes it to a robot to honor a commitment that she has made to the robot, she may
nevertheless implicitly sense the opposite" (Michael & Salice, 2017). Furthermore,
Székely et al. (2019) also found evidence of commitment in HRI. In a 2-player version
of the classic snake game, the authors measured how long participants waited before
ending the game, that was becoming gradually boring over time. Results showed
that participants waited longer when they believed that the robot was investing
effort to accomplish the task.
Regarding vocal cues, the first hypothesis focused on establishing which type of
voice could influence the development of trust. Comparisons between a synthetic
and a natural voice, showed participants investing more money in a robot with a
machine-like voice. In line with the hypothesis, participants overall trusted voice
congruent robots more than incongruent ones. This result confirmed W. J. Mitchell
et al. (2011) finding and demonstrated that a natural voice can be perceived as a
cross-modal mismatch between the voice and the physical features of the robot.
That is, a natural voice can be too human for a machine. However, participants’
investments toward the end of the game were not affected by the type of voice. In the
natural voice condition, in fact, participants increased gradually their investments
and reached the same amount of the synthetic voice. This result indicates that,
although a congruent synthetic voice is preferred, people can learn to accept and
trust an ’uncanny’ robot if given enough time.
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A third hypothesis concerned a facilitation effect of joint attention. In comparing
interactions with a robot showing gaze engagement and pointing gestures with a
static robot, participants were expected to invest more money in the former condition.
Results partially confirmed this hypothesis. Although participants’ investments in
the first half of the game were not affected by the attentional behaviour, in the second
half of the game investments for joint attention consistently increased. This result
indicated that overall participants preferred interacting with a robot showing hand
pointing and gaze engagement skills (Admoni et al., 2011; Staudte & Crocker, 2011),
albeit this effect manifested itself after some time. While joint attention had no main
effect in the game, it was consistently linked to participants’ explicit judgments in the
questionnaires. In particular, it was a significant predictor of perceived likeability,
trustworthiness, credibility, anthropomorphism, animacy, intelligence and safety of
the robot.
A fourth hypothesis was related to the limit of the anthropomorphic effect on
trust. Participants were expected to prefer human-like traits in situations of low
payoff (mean behaviour) while trusting more a machine-like type of robot in a
more profitable condition (generous behaviour). This hypothesis has been partially
confirmed by the interaction between voice, behaviour and game turn. Participants,
in fact, invested more in a natural voice in the mean condition. These results are in
line with the hypothesis that the context of the interaction plays a key role in the
application of anthropomorphism in HRI (see Chapter 1, section 1.5.1). In the case of
low payoff, participants were unable to find a strategy that could guarantee them a
sufficient return. It is then possible that participants started looking for cues that
could suggest to them how to increase their chances to regain some money. This
cues could be derived from the voice of the robot. As Epley’s theory suggested,
anthropomorphism is the best tool we have to explain what is unknown. In a
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condition in which participants did not know how to successfully accomplish their
task, the natural voice of the robot could have been the anthropomorphic feature that
helped them in maintaining trust. Moreover, the mean attitude of the robot could
have been perceived as an intention to keep all the profits. This type of behaviour
is mostly a human prerogative, thus associating it to human-like features could
increase participants’ willingness to invest in the robot.
On the contrary, in the generous condition, participants preferred to invest in
a machine-like voice. In this condition, the anthropomorphic features of the robot
could have been an unnecessary complement. In the case of high payoff, the strategy
to apply is easy to be found, thus no particular effort was needed during the game.
This type of scenario was more consistent with the classical vision of HRI, in which
the robot is supposed to perform with our needs. Since no specific effort was needed
and since the robot was performing as expected, anthropomorphic features became
a useless complement in this condition. These results have also been confirmed by
the Likeability questionnaires. Participants preferred a mean robot with a natural
voice, and generous one with a synthetic voice.
3.5 Conclusion
This study offered the possibility to better investigate the development of trust
over time, and the limits of anthropomorphism in affecting it. Data here reported
demonstrated that humans can ascribe intentionality to robots and develop a sense
of commitment. More importantly, this study finally offered a reliable behavioural
alternative to study trust in HRI. While there has been a wide usage of explicit
methodologies, mostly through questionnaires, a reliable implicit measure of the
development of trust over time was still missing. Implicit measures, differently from
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explicit measures, can provide evidence of cognition, inclination or attitudes which
participants are not aware of. In fact, the outcome of implicit measures could become
an index of the attitudes and cognition participants have no control or conscious
access to (De Houwer, 2006). It has also been pointed out that explicit attitudinal
data do not correlate with behavioural data (De Houwer, 2006; Greenwald, 1990).
Furthermore, a downside of explicit measures such as questionnaires is that they
focus on immediate impressions, without taking into account how the attribution
might evolve over time. While explicit measures are more frequently used in HRI
research, there are a few studies collecting implicit measures of trust. DeSteno
et al. (2012) recorded face-to-face verbal interactions between human participants
and a Nexi robot, to identify sequences of non-verbal cues that were indicative of
trustworthy behaviour, thus demonstrating that the accuracy of trustworthiness
judgments of novel partners could be influenced by exposure to nonverbal cues.
Haring, Matsumoto, and Watanabe (2013), among other measures, used proxemics,
the interpersonal distance between a person and a robot, to measure the person’s
implicit trust towards the robot. Finally, P. A. Hancock et al. (2011) suggested that
future research should use implicit data to study human-robot trust, and mentioned
the problem of individual measures taken after a single interaction, which are not
informative of trust development. The current results suggested that implicit and
explicit measures might both contribute to understanding how trust is formed,
although they might describe different aspects of it.
Human-robot trust cannot be measured in a single way. The present findings
showed that, given the different caveats and interpretations inherent to different
methods, one type measurement is not enough to give a complete picture of the
underlying trusting behaviours and the reasons behind them.
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Nevertheless, the evolution of trust in HRI has been explored throughout a small
temporal window. As both voice and attention have been shown to change trust over
time, future studies should further contribute to the exploration of trust evolution on
a longer term. This would allow having a more complete picture of which features




Investigating cooperation with robotic
peers
An’ why? Because...because I got
you to look after me, and you got me
to look after you, and that’s why.
Of Mice and Men
John Steinbeck
4.1 Introduction
Over the last decades, robotic agents have become sophisticated to the extent that
anthropomorphism could lead us to accept them as our peers. Research in this
field has focused upon the design factors, resemblance and socio-cognitive skills
that enhance social relations with robots (Duffy, 2003; Eyssel, 2017; Fong et al., 2003;
Gaudiello et al., 2016; Walters, Syrdal, Dautenhahn, Te Boekhorst, & Koay, 2008).
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With the widening usage of robots, their role has moved from that of a complex
automated tool to include situations where they can operate as a teammate able
to assist humans in the completion of joint tasks (Ma, Fong, Micire, Kim, & Feigh,
2018). However, most of the time the role of the robot is usually subordinate or
complementary, limited to assisting or complementing human teammates in their
task.
Of interest to this chapter is the extension of this cooperative relationship beyond
the HHI. In this study, interactions with a robot peer, a machine entity that had
the same role, task, and decision-making ability as their human compatriot, were
examined. The aim of the study is to recreate a cooperative relationship typically
experienced in human-human studies of cooperation by establishing procedural
equality between humans and robots. This has important implications for studies
of HRI as a robotic peer may have different motivations, preferences or intentions
to their human partner. Thus, when a robot has the same freedom of action as
a human peer, these factors could affect the outcome of the interaction such that
the robot might not always be disposed to cooperate in a manner desirable to the
human partner. Specifically, cooperation in human-robot partnerships was examined,
with the aim of understanding the perception and reaction to robots that might
adopt an independent, potentially non-cooperative, strategy to that of the human
partners. Although the exhibition of non-cooperative behaviour might be perceived
as acceptable, albeit regrettable, in human partners, this type of behaviour typically
falls outside of the envelope of accepted norms for robots. As such, a key component
of the study is to examine whether our perceptions of non-cooperative robots would
be modulated by how "human" the robots are in their general behaviour.
It has been established that people prefer to collaborate with a robot that is
socially competent, physically more human-like, as well as capable of performing
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verbal and nonverbal behaviour (Fink, 2012). In particular, gaze cueing, hand and
arm gestures are primary candidates for extending the communicative capabilities
of social robots, tending to result in a more positive and trustworthy evaluation
of the robot (Mutlu et al., 2009; Staudte & Crocker, 2011). These cues encourage
anthropomorphic projections onto robots that increase the belief that they harbour
their own independent intentions. Thus, if the robot exhibits human-like interactive
features a lack of cooperation in the robot may be perceived as an intentional act.
Conversely, the same behaviour in a less-human like robot could be ascribed to a
programmed behaviour, with the perception of a non-interactive machine fixed in a
predetermined behaviour.
Participants in this study were engaged in a cooperative investment game with a
robotic partner. Both the robot and the participants were provided with a virtual
sum of money for each round of the game and had to independently decide how
much to risk in an "investment" with a robot "banker". Any money they did not
invest was safe, but any sum invested in the banker could be returned to them with
an additional profit. To encourage a collaborative strategy between the partners, the
banker would penalise any investments as a function of the difference in the invested
amounts decided upon by the human and robot partners. Therefore, more profit
could potentially be earned if both the robot and the participants adopted a common,
rather than a separate investment strategy. Within the experiment, the robotic
partners could be programmed to be cooperative and would alter their investment
strategy to approach that of the human. Conversely, non-cooperative robots would
not alter their investment in relation to decisions made by the participant, adopting a
completely independent strategy. In the latter case, the participant would have to be
willing to adopt a similar investment strategy to the robot so as not to be penalised
by the banker.
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Through an examination of investment decisions and questionnaire responses
provided by participants across these experiment factors, an exploration of our
perception and cooperation with robotic peers has been given. The participants
were expected to follow similar social conventions in HRC as they would in an HHC
situation. That is, with participants preferring to reciprocate cooperative behaviours
demonstrated by the robotic confederate (i.e. participants changing their investment
decisions to more closely conform to that of the robot if the robot behaved likewise).
The willingness of participants to change their decisions to conform to the strategy
of the robot was a key dependent measure in this study, one that is predicted to be
modified by the anthropomorphic status projected onto the robot. An additional
experiment factor explored this potential interaction. Half of the participants inter-
acted with a robotic partner that showed anthropomorphic behaviours, simulating
joint attention and talking to the participants. The remaining participants interacted
with a robot that was both static and mute. It was then hypothesised that the
likelihood of cooperative behaviour would be increased if the robot also behaved in
an anthropomorphic manner, moving and talking, than if it was silent and immobile.
However, based upon the results of the previous study (Section 3.4), participants
were expected to be more cooperative with human-like robots when the banker was
being mean but, conversely, more cooperative with less-human-like robots when the
banker was generous.
Differently from the previous chapter, this study allows to examine whether this
differential behaviour is also evident when cooperating with a confederate, itself a
third party to that generous or mean behaviour. Considering that in the previous
study participants invested in a physical mean/generous robot, this third party was
introduced as a physical robot banker. This would also offer more coherence to the
experimental setting in which all parties were present in the scenario. Furthermore,
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the presence of a banker would add the robot confederate the chance of producing
more interactive actions in the anthropomorphic condition. Nevertheless, since
the focus of this study was the dyadic interaction between the participants and the
robot confederate, no other manipulations of the banker features and behaviours
have been included. That is, the banker was solely staying immobile within every
condition of the experiment.
4.2 Method
4.2.1 Participants
There were 96 participants (70 female and 26 male; mean age = 20.02 years, SD = 2.25
years) in the study, all of whom were naïve as to the purpose of the investigation and
gave informed written consent of their willingness to participate. All participants
were native British English speakers, they were right-handed, and reported normal
hearing and no language or neurological impairments. Familiarity or any previous




In the experiment setting, the participants and the NAO robot confederate sat facing
each other over their game interface screens, as shown in Figure 4.1. In the corner of
the room, the NAO robot banker was seated, also with its own game interface screen.
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Fig. 4.1 Cooperative Investment Game setup
The participants were told that the goal of the game was to earn as much money
as possible. At the start of each round of the game, both the participants and the robot
confederate were given a notional sum of 10 Experimental Currency Units (ECU).
The participants then had to decide how much of that sum to risk in an investment
with the robot banker, making a decision to invest between 0 and 10 ECUs (e.g.
player invests 3 ECU). The participants were also aware that, concurrent with their
own investment choice, the robot confederate was also making its own investment
decision. This initial investment choice of the robot confederate followed a fixed
script, for which the investment was calculated on the basis of the participant’s initial
choice. Specifically, the robot confederate was instructed to randomly subtract or add
a number between 3 and 4 to the participants’ choice. In this way, the initial choice of
both parties was never too distant. Likewise, when making their initial investment




After both parties had made their investment decisions (e.g. participant: 3, robot:
6), the participants were shown the confederate robot initial investment choice on
the screen. The robot then was able to modify that initial investment choice (e.g.
robot: 6 to 5 ECU investment). After that decision, the participants were then shown
the final investment choice of the confederate robot and were given the chance to
modify their own investment decision (e.g. participant: 3 to 4 ECU investment).
When that decision had been made, the final investment amounts for the participants
and the confederate robot were summed, tripled and sent to the robot banker (e.g.
banker receives 3*(4 + 5) = 27 ECU). The banker robot would then follow a fixed
script and return a percentage of that sum back to the investors (e.g. 30% of 27
= 8.1 ECU, so 4.05 ECU to each player). However, this returned investment from
the banker could also be modified downward, dependent upon the similarities of
the final investment decisions of the participants and the robot confederate. This
modifier was calculated as the absolute difference between the participants and the
confederate robot final investment decision (e.g. abs(4-5) = 1). This modifier was
then subtracted from the bankers returned investment (e.g. 8.1-1 = 7.1 ECU) before
that sum was returned to both the participants and the confederate robot (3.55 ECU
to each player). At the end of each round, the participants’ display would show
how much both parties had made from that round, the banker punishment and the
cumulative total of each of their bank of ECU over the played rounds. In each block
of the game, the participant would play 20 rounds, although they were not aware
when the game would terminate.
Participants would each play two blocks of investment rounds. The experiment
was counterbalanced in a 2 (banker: generous or mean) by 2 (confederate behaviour:
anthropomorphic or mute) between subject and a 2 (confederate strategy: collabo-
rative and fixed) within subject design. For the banker condition, there were two
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scripts that dictated the return of investments. In the generous condition, it was
scripted to return 50% to 80% of the received amount at each round to both players,
while in the mean condition it was scripted to return 0% to 30% of the received
amount.
The confederate strategy described the likelihood and that the robot would
change its initial investment decision to agree with that of the initial choice of the
participants. In the collaborative condition, the confederate robot would select a
final investment decision close or equal to the initial decision of the participant (e.g.
participant: 3 ECU, robot: 6 ECU; the robot would then decide to invest between 3
and 4 ECU). This has been calculated on the basis of the participants’ initial choice,
which was multiplied by a numerical coefficient (randomly between 0.1 and 0.3)
and then added or subtracted from the same initial choice. In the fixed condition
the confederate would make a second choice close to that of its own initial one (e.g.
participant: 3 ECU, robot: 6 ECU; the robot would then decide to invest between 6
and 7 ECU). This has been calculated on the basis of the robot confederate initial
choice, to which a numerical coefficient (randomly 0 or 1) was added or subtracted.
This would give the impression of the confederate playing a cooperative rather than
an individualistic strategy. Calculations for the final investment of the robot in both




1+ (P1 ∗ rc2) if P1 < 6
P1− (P1 ∗ rc2) if P1 ≥ 6
(4.1)
1where R1(2) is robot first(final) investment, P1 is participant first investment and rc2 is robot






1+ rc1 if P1 < 6
R1− rc1 if P1 ≥ 6
(4.2)
In the final component of the design, the robot confederate would behave in an
anthropomorphic manner or would be immobile and mute. In the former condition,
the robot confederate would look at the screen and point to its choice at the beginning
of the round, then look at the participants while it waited for their decision. After the
participants made their initial decision, the robot would provide a spoken summary
of the choices, then turn its gaze to the screen for the second part of the round, point
at the screen, then move its attention to the participants and declare its final choice.
After the participants made the final choice, the robot confederate would declare
"let’s see what the banker decides" while turning its head toward the banker. After
the banker returned the investments, the confederate would look back at the screen,
then turn back to the participants and summarise the payoffs. A detailed timeline of
the anthropomorphic condition is reported on Figure 4.2.
In the mute behaviour, the peer always stared at the display and never spoke,
with all information and interactions within the game represented on the game
interface screen of the participants. In both conditions, the behaviour of the robot
banker was always mute and immobile.
Participants played both blocks with two identical NAO mates, one preferring
a collaborative strategy and one preferring the fixed one. The order which the
participants faced the two robot confederates was counterbalanced. At the end of
each game, participants were asked to complete a set of questionnaires. The total
amount earned by the participants at the end of each game was converted to British
2where R1(2) is robot first(final) investment and rc1 is robot coefficient (0 or 1)
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Start
Gaze on Screen
3 to 6 Sec wait (random)
Robot investment and Pointing
Gaze on participant
Sentence ”I made my choice”
Participant already invested
1 Sec Wait
Gaze on monitor and sentence
(summary of both choices)




Sentence (summary of both final choices)




Participant had not invested yet
Wait for participant’s choice
Fig. 4.2 Experimental Timeline for the anthropomorphic condition.
82
4.3 Results
Pounds, at a rate of 30 ECU = £0.10, and the sum of what they earned in the two
games was paid to them at the end of the experiment.
Questionnaires
Four questionnaires were used as secondary measures to the main game task.
Three short scales measured likeability, trust, and credibility (Goldberg et al., 2006;
McCroskey & Young, 1981; Reysen, 2005). In addition, Bartneck et al. (2008)
questionnaire was used to measure a range of HRI factors (anthropomorphism,
animacy, likeability, perceived intelligence and perceived safety). Participants filled
in the questionnaires about the robot confederate after the first investment game
block and again after the second investment game block. Finally, participants were
debriefed, paid the show-up fee plus what they had earned in the game.
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Investment game results
In this study, cooperation has been defined as participants’ willingness to reduce
the distance between their choice and the robot confederate investment. This has
been measured via cooperation index, which has been calculated by comparing the
participants’ first and second investment decision to the robot confederate final




−R2) ≤ (P2−R2) = 0
if (P1−R2) > (P2−R2) = 1
(4.3)
3where P1(2) is participants’ first(final) investment and R2 is robot final investment
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Every trial in which the participants changed their investment and moved closer
to the robot confederate decision have been categorized as 1. On the opposite,
every trial in which participants did not change investment, or chose a more distant
amount, have been categorized as 0. Finally, all the trials in which both players
initially invested the same amount of money were excluded from the analyses.
A logistic mixed-effects model was fitted to the data using backward stepwise
selection, with cooperation index as dependent variable, banker (generous/mean),
behaviour (anthropomorphic/mute), strategy (collaborative/fixed) and game turn
(the 20 rounds of the game) as independent variables and participant id as the
random factor. Odds ratio and confidence intervals are reported in Table 4.1.











A significant main effect of strategy was found (χ2(1) = 5.64,p = .017); cooperation
increased when the robot confederate followed a collaborative strategy (mean = 0.51)
than a fixed one (mean = 0.47). Moreover, game turn showed a significant effect
(χ2(1) = 9.71,p = .002); participants’ cooperation gradually increased toward the end
of the experiment block. Banker and behaviour were not significant (ps > .05).
The two-way interaction between strategy and behaviour was also significant





















Fig. 4.3 Cooperation index in the collaborative and fixed strategies, for both behaviour
(anthropomorphic and mute) conditions.
collaborative strategy (p > .050). A fixed strategy, instead, associated with the
anthropomorphic behaviour (mean = 0.50), showed higher cooperation than a mute
confederate (mean = 0.43, p = .039).
Finally, a significant three-way interaction between banker, behaviour and strategy
has been found (χ2(4) = 37.81,p < .001). As shown in Figure 4.4, for the mean banker,
cooperation was greater with an anthropomorphic behaviour than the mute one, only
with the collaborative confederate (p < .001), while no differences have been found
for the fixed strategy (p > .050). For the generous banker, a mute behaviour was
preferred to the anthropomorphic one, only with the collaborative robot confederate
(p < .001), thus cooperation was greater in the former condition. On the opposite,
no effect of behaviour has been found for the fixed strategy (p > .050). Moreover,
for the mute behaviour, cooperation was lower with the fixed confederate than
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generous mean

















Fig. 4.4 Cooperation index in the collaborative and fixed strategies, for both behaviour
(anthropomorphic and mute) and banker (generous and mean) conditions
the collaborative one (p < .001). No other significant differences have been found
(ps > .050).
4.3.2 Questionnaires Results
For all the scales, a linear mixed-effects model was fitted to the data, with scale
as dependent variable, banker (generous/mean), strategy (collaborative/fixed)and
behaviour (anthropomorphic/mute) as independent variables and participant id as a
random factor. Post-hoc comparisons, where needed, were assessed using t-tests.
As shown in Table 4.3, behaviour had an effect for Likeability, Trust, Credibility and
Animacy scales, with higher ratings for the anthropomorphic robot. Strategy affected
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Animacy and Intelligence scales, showing higher ratings for the collaborative robot
confederate. The banker had no influences on the questionnaires.











Table 4.3 Main effects of questionnaires.
Banker Strategy Behaviour
Likeability n.s. n.s. χ2(1) = 4.08, p = .043
Trust n.s. n.s χ2(1) = 16.72, p < .001
Credibility n.s. n.s. χ2(1) = 10.13, p = .001
Godspeed Questionnaires
Anthropomorphism n.s. n.s. n.s.
Animacy n.s. χ2(1) = 4.21, p = .040 χ
2
(1) = 14.00, p < .001
Likeability n.s. n.s. χ2(1) = 22.40, p < .001
Intelligence n.s. χ2(1) = 4.40, p = .036 n.s.
Safety n.s. n.s. n.s.
The interaction between behaviour and strategy was significant for Likeability,
Credibility, Animacy (χ2(1) = 8.69, p = .013; χ
2
(1) = 16.05, p < .001; χ
2
(1) = 6.24, p = .012).
For all these scales, the fixed strategy in the anthropomorphic behaviour was rated
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higher than in the mute one (ps < .05). No other significant interactions have been









































Fig. 4.5 Participants ratings in the collaborative and fixed strategies for behaviour (anthropo-
morphic/mute) condition, for Likeability, Credibility and Animacy scales.
4.4 Discussion
The aim of this study was to explore HRC in partnerships where the robots operated
as peers with the same role, task and decision-making ability as their human
compatriots. This was conducted by pairing participants with a robot in an economic
investment game in which both parties were free to adopt their own independent
strategies. The caveat to the independence of the decisions in this partnership was
that the banker, the robot that returned investments back to the partners, would
punish partners proportionally to the divergence between their strategies. This
provided an economic incentive for the participants and the robot to cooperate and
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adopt similar investment strategies. Within each round of the investment game,
both the participants and the robot confederate made an initial investment decision
simultaneously, after which each was provided with an opportunity to review and
potentially change their decision in light of the decision made by their partner.
This review process was conducted serially, with the robotic confederate acting
first. Thus, the participants had knowledge of their robotic confederate original and
revised decision before making their own revised investment decision for that round.
The robot confederate in the collaborative condition was programmed to behave
cooperatively such that, in the review phase, it would change its original investment
decision to one closer to that of the participants. In the fixed condition, the robot
confederate would not take any account of the participants’ choice when making
its final investment decision. In this procedure, the participants were recorded as
having made a cooperative decision if their revised investment was more similar to
the robot confederate final investment choice than their original investment decision.
That is, they had made a modification of their strategy to cooperate with the choice
of their confederate.
Experimental results showed that the strategical attitude of the robot confederate
affected the participants’ willingness to cooperate. Participants have shown to
be more cooperative when the robot confederate was collaborative (showing an
investment closer to the participants’ initial choice) than when it was fixed and
decided autonomously the final investment.
Data also showed also that participants’ cooperation can change over time. The
cooperation index was shown to gradually increase over time, thus signalling that
participants learned to cooperate with the robot through experience.
The type of strategy also interacted with the behaviour of the confederate. In a
between-participant factor, the robotic confederate could be programmed to display
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a human-like behaviour, engaging in joint attention with the participants and using
spoken language to communicate their interactions. In the mute condition, the robot
confederate was static and did not speak, with its decisions solely communicated by
the game control screen. This experiment factor was introduced to examine whether
the perceived intentionality of the robotic partner would influence cooperation.
This was under the premise that decisions made by an anthropomorphic robot
would be more likely to be ascribed to its own individual intentions, rather than a
pre-programmed strategy imposed by a third party. In this two-way interaction, an
anthropomorphic robotic partner increased participants’ cooperation with a fixed
strategy when compared with the mute confederate. When being exposed to a
collaborative confederate, the level of anthropomorphism did not affect participants’
willingness to cooperate. However, when facing a selfish and fixed confederate,
anthropomorphism increased their tendency to cooperate. These results are also
supported by the perceptions of the robots collected in the questionnaire data.
Notably, overall participants preferred the anthropomorphic and collaborative
robot, but the mute robot received the lowest scores (and lower cooperation) when
associated with a selfish strategy. It could be concluded that a selfish strategy
could benefit from a more interactive behaviour, which is capable of maintaining a
sufficient level of motivation for cooperating with the robot, whereas it would be
worthless in front of a static and selfish machine.
These two factors interacted significantly with the type of payoff, thus a generous
or a mean banker. In this three-way interaction, it was found that a collaborative
robotic partner would increase the participants’ cooperation over its non-cooperative
variant in two specific situations. The first of these was when the banker was
generous and the robot was non-anthropomorphic, the second when the banker was
mean and the robot was anthropomorphic.
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This pattern of results had similarities to the previous study (see Chapter 3, section
3.4) confirming and extending the evidence that human-like features and behaviours
in robotic agents are preferred and encourage greater cooperation when the social
environment becomes more hostile. In a condition in which participants did not
know how to successfully increase their payoff (like for the mean banker), the voice
and the movements of the confederate could have been the anthropomorphic feature
that helped them in maintaining cooperation. On the contrary, in the generous
condition, participants preferred to cooperate with a machine-type of confederate.
In this condition, like in the previous chapter, the anthropomorphic features of the
confederate robot could have been an unnecessary complement. This condition, in
fact, did not need any particular effort from the participants, which could easily gain
a consistent amount of money. This scenario is once again closer to the classical HRI,
in which the robots, both the banker and the confederate, behave in an expected
manner that is supporting the best possible outcome for the participants. Since
both robots are doing what robots are usually expected to do, namely improve
the participants’ condition, they are also expected to behave like robots, thus not
interacting. These results are in line with previous literature about robots behaving
in unusual and unexpected way (Mirnig et al., 2017; Ragni et al., 2016; Salem, Eyssel,
Rohlfing, Kopp, & Joublin, 2013; Short et al., 2010; Ullman, Leite, Phillips, Kim-Cohen,
& Scassellati, 2014), stating that predictable and well-functioning robots are not
always the best candidate for a profitable anthropomorphic interaction.
This experiment demonstrates that the previous results on anthropomorphism
(Torre, Goslin, White, & Zanatto, 2018) can be extended to a triadic interaction and
that cooperation and trust in an agent can also derive from other parties. In the
previous study (Chapter 3), one robot was both performing anthropomorphic/mute
behaviours and deciding the payoff. In the present study instead, this scenario has
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been split and two agents have been used, demonstrating that similar results can be
obtained. However, future research should investigate also the role of an interactive
banker. Stemming from the present results, it is possible that an interactive banker
could raise further consensus and cooperation in the condition of low payoff. Lastly,
the role of a human confederate, in the presence of a robotic banker, could give some
useful insights on the role of the banker itself.
4.5 Conclusion
This study examined cooperation in human-robot partnerships where the robot was
established as a peer of the human partner, with the same role and decision-making
ability as their human compatriot. One of the main aims of the study was to
understand our perception and reaction to robots that are capable of adopting an
independent strategy that is not subordinate to our own. In this situation, are we
more cooperative with robots that behave in a human-like manner, and so might
be expected to have their own intentions, or with more machine-like robots whose
lack of cooperation could be ascribed to a fixed programming? Results indicated
that it was both, depending on the cooperative environment participants found
themselves in. When the cooperative environment was benign, with the robotic
banker returning more money than invested, players reciprocated the cooperation
of the robot confederate more often when it behaved in a machine-like manner.
Conversely, when the environment was hostile, with the banker returning a net
loss to investments, the reciprocation of cooperation was increased when the robot
confederate was more human-like. This would appear to suggest that we may prefer
our robots to exhibit machine-like attributes, such as constancy and reliability, while
our relationship is beneficial. However, when we are in a more hostile environment,
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we prefer to seek the cooperation of human-like robots, seeking out social attributes




Strategical Social Learning in HRI
You’re so perfect, you’re so right as rain
You make me hungry again.
Everything you do is irresistible
Everything you do is simply kissable
Why can’t I be you?
Why can’t I be you
The Cure
5.1 Introduction
Human beings naturally imitate, from newborns rapidly learning by observing
others, (Meltzoff & Marshall, 2018), to adults subconsciously mimicking partners
postures and mannerisms (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Chartrand, Cheng, & Jefferis,
2002). Indeed, observing other persons’ choices and decisions and the associated
outcomes offers a rich source of information that individuals can use to improve
their behaviour without direct experience and without the risks it might entail
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(Bandura, 1962, 1978). Imitating someone else’s strategy is generally less costly than
autonomously learning a new behaviour; indeed, it is often costless. This type of
social learning can thus be a useful instrument to improve our ability to choose the
right behaviour, to apply the right problem-solving strategy and to increase the
probability of a positive outcome (Olsson & Phelps, 2007; Van Den Bos, Jolles, &
Homberg, 2013; Wisdom, Song, & Goldstone, 2013). Importantly, however, merely
copying others indistinctly others not increase the probability of producing the
correct behaviour (Boyd & Richerson, 2009). Instead, this type of imitation needs to
be applied selectively, based on whether and when it would be more beneficial than
to learn through direct experience.
Human strategies to imitate others have been previously studied. For example,
Pingle (1995) argued that imitation plays an important role in real-world decision
making because it is one of the procedures that allow the decision maker to economise
on decision costs. In a series of five experiments, participants faced several decision
problems and the possibility to imitate other players has been manipulated through-
out the experiments by setting different costs to access other players choices, as well
as their reliability. The results showed that participants increased their tendency to
imitate when making unfamiliar decisions, when they believed their strategy could
be substantially improved, and when they became unsatisfied with the outcomes of
their own strategy. Similarly, Vega-Redondo (1997) found that imitation is associated
with others’ high payoff in repeated choice problems, which can likely be explained
by the use of an ’imitate the best’ approach: simply choosing the strategy that
performed best among the observed actions in the previous period. Laland (2004),
meanwhile, found that the factors that people take into account upon deciding when
to imitate a behaviour include the productiveness of the established behaviour, the
cost of learning and their feeling of uncertainty.
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Human behaviour and decisions thus depend to some degree on the choices
made by others, for example when they choose to imitate the strategy of others,
and past research has studied this in HHI. Presently, however, we are entering an
age in which intelligent artificial agents become increasingly prevalent in society.
Although the robot is often not autonomous, it is typically teleoperated in a manner
to give the impression of autonomy (the so-called Wizard-of-Oz paradigm). It is
thus realistic that a robot behaviour might be another source that human beings
will choose to imitate if it appears beneficial. One might even speculate that this
could translate onto very different agents such as autonomous vehicles in the context
of traffic behaviour (Thill et al., 2018). This chapter investigates whether humans
are willing to imitate robots as they imitate other humans. In addition to having
consequences for future societal roles for artificial agents – from assistive to medical
and military applications – this might lead to a novel measure of robot acceptance.
Studies in HRI have previously addressed imitation, but almost exclusively with a
focus on the robot capability to imitate humans (Vanderelst & Winfield, 2017), such as
whether and when to imitate people (Breazeal & Scassellati, 2002) in order to produce
the right behaviour, complete a task correctly, and give the illusion that robots can be
similar to us. This kind of work has resulted in robots with increased capabilities and
functionalities, but the measurement of their acceptance is still confined to collecting
people’s judgements and opinions (e.g. Barnes, FakhrHosseini, Jeon, Park, & Howard,
2017; De Graaf & Allouch, 2013; Winkle, Caleb-Solly, Turton, & Bremner, 2018). The
experiment presented here instead also explores whether imitative behaviours can
be an indirect measure of robot acceptance: does willingness to reproduce a robot
behaviour indicate it is perceived to be trustworthy and successful?
To investigate both the willingness to imitate and the potential as a measure
of robot acceptance, participants in this study were asked to play the Economic
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Investment Game with a humanoid robot banker, while also observing a second
humanoid robot playing the same game. The behaviour of the robot banker was
manipulated so that participants perceived different degrees of fairness toward the
two players: the banker was programmed to either punish both players, punish the
human player and reward the robot player, or punish the robot player and reward
the human player. The robot player was itself programmed to invest consistently
with the banker behaviour and to maximise its income (such as playing high when
generously rewarded and low when punished) and thereby appear strategically
competent to participants. It was hypothesised the emergence of an imitative
tendency under conditions of uncertainty as predicted by Pingle (1995), as well
as in case of other’s success, as described by Vega-Redondo (1997). Specifically,
participants were expected to follow the costless ’imitate the best’ rule strategy and
copy the robot player strategy whenever it was generously rewarded by the robot
banker.
The key dependent measure of this study was the monetary amount invested
by the participants, that was predicted to be modified by the observation of the
robot player success. If participants decide to copy the robot player following the
’imitate the best’ rule, then their investments should rise significantly despite the
banker punishment. If imitation is present, it could be seen as an implicit indication
of acceptance as it might indicate that participants consider the robot a reliable agent
and worth their trust. However, participants were not expected to imitate the robot
when both players were punished, or only the robot was. When both players were
punished, the strategy would be identical for both, while, whenever the participants
were rewarded, imitating a punished player would, in fact, be detrimental.
This type of study also needs to take into account the possibly anthropomorphised
perception of a robot. Moreover, on the light of previous chapters findings, it is
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compelling to wonder whether people would imitate a robot strategy because it
is perceived as a well-programmed entity capable of applying the right strategy
to the game, or because its human-like interactivity makes them follow the social
rules of HHI. To be able to distinguish whether participants imitated the robot
strategy because it was perceived a well-programmed entity capable of applying
the right strategy to the game, or simply because of its human-like interactivity,
participants’ imitative behaviour during the game with an anthropomorphic robot
player (engaging in joint attention behaviour, performing congruent movements,
and speaking) were compared to those with an immobile one. A beneficial effect of
anthropomorphism in increasing imitation was expected only when the robot player
was successfully rewarded by the banker while participants received lower rewards.
Since there was no strategic reason for participants to imitate the robot in the other
conditions, no effect of anthropomorphic behaviour on the investment was expected.
5.2 Method
5.2.1 Participants
90 individuals (66 female and 23 male; mean age = 19.81 years, SD = 2.55 years)
participated in the study. All participants were naïve as to the purpose of the
investigation and gave informed written consent of their willingness to participate.
All participants were native British English speakers, they were right-handed and
reported normal hearing and no language or neurological impairments. Familiarity
or any previous experience with robots was the main exclusion criteria, which was
assessed during the recruitment phase.
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5.2.2 Procedure
Investment game
The participants (called "human player") and one NAO robot (called "robot player")
were seated next to each other in front of a second NAO robot (called " robot banker").
One touchscreen monitor was placed in front of the two players, and a second
screen was placed in front of the banker (Figure 5.1). Both players were playing
Fig. 5.1 Imitative Investment Game setup.
independent games with the robot banker and the goal for both was to earn as much
money as possible. Each player started with a notional sum of 10 Experimental
Currency Units (ECU) at the beginning of every round of the game. The number of
rounds was not known to the participants.
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The participants engaged in two games, and each round proceeded as follows:
first the two players made their choices on how much to invest in the banker, by
indicating a number on the respective side of the screen; the two amounts were
separately tripled and sent to the banker, which then separately returned some of
the money to both players by declaring the payoff.
To facilitate the participants in noticing the robot player choices, the display was
split into two equal sectors (Figure 5.2), which had both 11 numbered touchscreen
buttons that players could press to indicate the amount of money they wanted to
invest in each round. Once the investment was made, the chosen number lightened
in green. The display also showed how much money the two players were making.
These displays were named "bank" and were accumulating all the money each player
earned separately. The total amount earned by the participants at the end of each
game was converted to British Pounds, at a rate of 30 ECU = £0.10, and paid at the
end of the experiment.
Fig. 5.2 Imitative Investment Game display.
In terms of behaviour, the robot player arms and head movements were manipu-
lated, creating an anthropomorphic and a mute behaviour. In the anthropomorphic
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behaviour, the robot player started every round by looking at the screen, pointing at
it when making a choice and then turning its attention to the participants in the case
they had not taken any decision yet; it then looked at the robot banker and declared
its choice, waited for the robot banker to return the money and finally redirected the
gaze to the display. In the mute behaviour instead, the robot player always stared at
the screen and never spoke. To avoid any confounding effect, the robot banker was
staying immobile throughout the whole experiment. For a complete description of
the anthropomorphic condition, a detailed timeline is reported in Figure 5.3.
Participants played two blocks of rounds. In the first familiarisation block,
the robot banker was programmed to be generous and rewarded both players by
returning 50 % to 80 % of the received amount at each round. For each player, the
robot banker followed a separate script, so that the players did not receive the same
amount at any given round.
In the second block, the robot banker followed three different game conditions,
namely unfair-for-human, unfair-for-robot and unfair-for-both. In the unfair-for-
human condition, the banker returned 50 % to 80 % to the robot, and 0 % to 30 % to the
participants, thus being unfair only to the human player while rewarding the robot
one. On the opposite, in the unfair-for-robot condition the banker was returning
0 % to 30 % to the robot player, and 50 % to 80 % to the human, thus being mean
only to the robot. In the unfair-for-both condition instead, the banker was returning
0 % to 30 % to both players. Depending on the condition, the robot player was
programmed to play in a consistent way (e.g. increasing investment in case of a high
payoff, reducing the investment in case of unfair treatment). Specifically, the robot
player was programmed to invest between 6 and 10 ECUs in the unfair-for-human
condition and 0 and 4 ECUs in the remaining two conditions. The robot player










Robot Player points and invests
Participant already invested
Robot Player gaze on screen
1 Sec Wait
Robot Player gaze on Banker and sentence
(declares its own investment)
(2 to 4 sec Wait)
Banker declares the return
Participant had not invested yet
Robot Player gaze on participant
wait for participant investment
Fig. 5.3 Imitative Investment Game Timeline for the anthropomorphic condition.
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to avoid any interference during the game, the participants and the robots were left
alone in the room. Nevertheless, the experimenter could still monitor the game from
a window placed behind the participants.
Given that the first block was equal for all the participants, statistical analyses
have considered only the performances in the second block. The experiment was
counterbalanced in a 2 (behaviour: anthropomorphic or mute) by 3 (condition:
unfair-for-human, unfair-for-robot, unfair-for-both) between subject design.
Questionnaires
Four questionnaires were used as secondary measures to the main game task.
Three short scales measured likeability, trust, and credibility (Goldberg et al., 2006;
McCroskey & Young, 1981; Reysen, 2005). In addition, Bartneck et al. (2008)
questionnaire was used to measure a range of HRI factors (anthropomorphism,
animacy, likeability, perceived intelligence and perceived safety). Participants filled
in the questionnaires about the robot player after the investment games ended, were
debriefed, paid the show-up fee plus what they had earned in the game, and left.
5.3 Results
5.3.1 Investment game results
One participant has been excluded from the analyses for not completing the experi-
mental session.
A linear mixed-effects model was fitted to the data using backwards stepwise




and game turn (the 20 rounds of the game) as independent variables, and participant
id as the random factor. Post-hoc comparisons were assessed using t-tests and
Bonferroni’s correction was applied when needed. The overall effect size of the












condition Unfair−for−Both Unfair−for−Human Unfair−for−Robot
Fig. 5.4 Participants’ investment in the Unfair-for-Both (light-blue line), Unfair-for-Human
(dark-blue line) and Unfair-for-Robot (red line) conditions.
A significant main effect of condition has been found (χ2(2) = 197.76, p < .001).
Participants’ investment was higher in the unfair-for-robot condition (mean = 8.53
ECU) when compared with both unfair-for-human (mean = 4.97 ECU, p > .001) and
unfair-for-both (mean = 2.85 ECU, p > .001). Moreover, in the unfair-for-human
condition participants were investing more than in the unfair-for-both condition
(p > .001). The robot player behaviour did not affect the investment (p > .05), but a
main effect for the game turn emerged (χ2(1) = 59.89, p < .001), showing an increase of
investment over time.
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Fig. 5.5 Participants’ investment in the three different conditions (unfair-for-human, unfair-
for-robot and unfair-for-both) for anthropomorphic and mute behaviours.
A significant two-way interaction between condition and behaviour has also been
found (χ2(3) = 8.28, p = .040) (Figure 5.5). The unfair-for-human condition showed
higher investments with the anthropomorphic behaviour than with the mute one
(5.78 vs 4.15 ECU, p < .001). Post-hoc comparisons did not show any other significant
effects (ps > .05).
Finally, the significant interaction between condition and game turn (χ2(2) = 141.08,
p < .001) revealed a decrease of investment over time for the unfair-for-human
(χ2(1) = 37.02, p < .001) and unfair-for-both conditions (χ
2
(1) = 105.03, p < .001), but the
investment in the former was constantly higher than in the latter. On the opposite,
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participants’ investment was constantly increasing for the unfair-for-robot condition
(χ2(1) = 66.65, p < .001).
5.3.2 Questionnaires Results











For all the scales, a linear mixed-effects model was fitted to the data, with scale as
dependent variable, behaviour (anthropomorphic/mute) and condition (unfair-for-
human/unfair-for-robot/unfair-for-both) as independent variables, and participant id
as random factor. Post-hoc comparisons were assessed using t-tests and Bonferroni’s
correction was applied when needed.
As reported in Table 5.2, the condition had an effect on Trust, Anthropomorphism
and Likeability scales, showing higher ratings for the robot player in the unfair-for-
human condition over the other two conditions (ps < .050). Behaviour affected Trust
and Animacy scales, where the anthropomorphic robot player was preferred to the
mute one (ps < .050).
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Table 5.2 Questionnaires analysis results.
Condition Behaviour Condition by Behaviour
Likeability n.s. n.s. χ2(5) = 24.09,p < .001
Trust χ2(2) = 18.38,p < .001 χ
2
(1) = 6.97,p = .017 n.s.
Credibility n.s. n.s. χ2(5) = 19.24,p = .002
Godspeed Questionnaires
Anthropomorphism χ2(2) = 28.28,p < .001 n.s. n.s.
Animacy n.s. χ2(1) = 13.45,p < .001 χ
2
(1) = 9.19,p = .056
Likeability χ2(2) = 19.16,p < .001 n.s. n.s.
Intelligence n.s. n.s. χ2(5) = 22.75,p < .001
Safety n.s. n.s. n.s.
Finally, a significant two-way interaction between behaviour and condition
showed higher preferences for the anthropomorphic behaviour in the unfair-for-
human condition over the mute one for Likeability (p = .003), Credibility (p = .003),
Animacy (p = .004) and Intelligence (p = .045) as shown in Figure 5.6.
5.4 Discussion
The phenomenon of social learning leads people to imitate others whenever imitation
is the simplest option with the highest success probability. In this chapter, the
phenomenon of imitative social learning in HRI was studied, wondering whether
humans can imitate a robot behaviour in the same way they do with other humans.
To do so, participants were asked to decide how much to invest in a robotic banker,
while observing another robot playing the same game. The banker generosity in
returning the money invested has been manipulated, creating three different unfair
scenarios (unfair-to-human, unfair-to-robot, unfair-to-both) in which one, or both
players, were punished. Following the literature on social learning, participants
were expected to apply the ’imitate the best’ rule, thus imitate the robot player
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Fig. 5.6 Participants’ ratings in the three different conditions (unfair-for-human, unfair-for-
robot and unfair-for-both) for anthropomorphic and mute behaviours, for Likeability (panel
A), Credibility (panel B), Animacy (panel C) and Intelligence (panel D) scales.
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strategy whenever they were the only investors punished by the banker. The results
reported here are in line with the experimental hypotheses and demonstrate that
humans can strategically imitate robots in social learning. Specifically, the amount
of money that the participants invested in the robot banker was significantly higher
in the unfair-for-human than the unfair-for-both condition. In the former condition,
participants chose to copy the robot strategy when they received low returns on
their investments while the robot player was generously rewarded during the whole
game. In other words, even though the optimal strategy would have been to reduce
the investment to the minimum, participants chose to increase their investment
following the strategy of the robot player to secure a better outcome (but receiving,
in fact, a suboptimal low payoff). The questionnaires also supported the imitative
hypothesis: the robot player in the unfair-for-human condition was rated more
likeable and trustworthy while ratings in the remaining two conditions did not
differ from each other. An alternative explanation for this imitative effect, however,
could derive from participants’ willingness to please the robot banker. In an attempt
to persuade the banker to change its attitude and increase the payoff, participants
might have decided to copy the robot player strategy. Following this interpretation,
the questionnaires ratings could be seen as an a posteriori attempt to rationalise their
strategical imitation. That is, participants liked more the robot player in order to
justify their imitative attitude. Nevertheless, participants’ investment was higher
in the unfair-for-robot condition than the unfair-for-human. Although copying the
robot player, participants did not adapt their strategy to an optimal level. Moreover,
their investment in the unfair-for-human condition gradually decreased toward the
end of the game, almost reaching the same investment chosen in the unfair-for-both
condition. This could be depending on the structure of the game. Once participants’
surrendered to the evidence that copying the robot player strategy would not increase
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their payoff, they found no other choice than applying a different strategy, thus
reducing their investment. Considering these two alternative explanations, it would
be advisable to further explore this triadic interaction and investigate also the role of
the banker in affecting this strategical social learning effect.
The present results are in line with previous literature on human and animal social
learning (Hoppitt & Laland, 2013; Kendal et al., 2018; Laland, 2004; Morgan, Rendell,
Ehn, Hoppitt, & Laland, 2012; Rendell et al., 2010), which found that productiveness,
cost of learning and uncertainty are the main contributors in deciding whether
to imitate a behaviour or not. Following someone’s successful behaviour, like for
the unfair-for-human condition, reduces uncertainty and increases the chances of
obtaining a positive outcome. When instead the other’s behaviour results in non-
positive outcomes, imitation is not anymore a suitable and costless option. Here, the
high investment observed in the unfair-for-robot condition showed, as hypothesised,
that participants were able to selectively identify in which condition it was useful
to imitate the robot strategy and did not show any interest in following the robot
player investment in the other conditions.
The second hypothesis in this study focused on the previous context-related
findings on anthropomorphism. This has been investigated by comparing the
participants’ performance next to a more or less interactive robot player. The type
of behaviour had no main effect, but the two-way interaction between condition
and behaviour showed that participants increased their investment in the unfair-for-
human condition whenever the robot player was more anthropomorphic. This result
confirmed once again the strategical social learning effect: when participants were
playing by their own rules, they were also not interested by the robot behaviour and
performance (since this was not helpful to them). However, when the participants
noticed that a better payoffwas possible (by observing the gains of the robot player),
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they not only looked to what the robot player was doing but also noticed whether
it was more or less human-like. As Epley et al. (2007) stated, people are lead to
anthropomorphise non-human agents in order to reduce the frustration and the
anxiety associated to the uncertainty of the interaction with the agent and to establish
a feeling of belonging. Here, participants might have increased their tendency to
imitate a more interactive robot, in response to the need of establishing a connection
and reduce uncertainty. Moreover, as imitation is usually human-human based, it is
possible that social learning became easier when paired a socially competent robot.
The questionnaires also support this explanation: the anthropomorphism scale
reported higher ratings for the robot player in the unfair-for-human, thus indicating
that participants were actively engaged and focused on the robot player only in that
condition. Moreover, the questionnaires showed a two-way interaction between
condition and behaviour that confirmed the behavioural results: participants rated
the anthropomorphic robot player more likeable, credible, animated and intelligent
than the immobile version in the unfair-for-human condition only. No effect has been
found for the other conditions. A robot showing social competences and engagement
capability thus increases the probability that people would accept its strategy as a
valuable and successful alternative.
5.5 Conclusion
Taken together these results not only demonstrate the existence of strategical social
learning between humans and robots, but they have also shown that this phenomenon
can be used as a reliable implicit measure of the evolution of social processes in HRI.
While research in HRI has predominantly focused on producing and designing a
robot capable of interacting with humans, the present study instead demonstrates
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the social impact that social robots can have in the way humans interact with them.
Moreover, evaluations of the effect of social robots have mostly been carried out
using explicit measurements. An implicit evaluation such as demonstrated here
could be instrumental in future research on how humans subconsciously perceive,
treat, and accept robotic agents.
Future studies, however, should further investigate the role of the banker. As a
social learning effect has been found, it is not completely clear whether participants’
increase of investment was effectively derived by the mere observation of the robot
player strategy or by any attempt to please the banker. Future research should focus
also on investigating participants’ perception of the banker through questionnaires.
Moreover, it would be interesting to expand this scenario by substituting a robot
banker with a human banker. Would participants choose to imitate the robot
player in front of a human banker? Would the robot player be perceived as an
’anthropomorphic outlier’ for this type of setting and thus reduce participants’
imitative tendency? These types of question should be explored in order to better




Leader conformity and deviation in
Human-Robot Interaction.
I’m sorry too, Dmitri. I’m very sorry. All right, you’re sorrier
than I am. But I am sorry as well. I am as sorry as you are,
Dmitri. Don’t say that you’re the more sorry than I am because I
am capable of being just as sorry as you are. So we’re both sorry,




Conformity is one of the instruments we use to be socially accepted. Individuals
facing a decision-making process, in fact, tend to generally conform to the audience
position to gain group approval (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). In other words, if we
engage in socially approved behaviours, others will approve us too.
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If on one hand conformity appears to reduce social disapproval (Asch and
Guetzkow, 1951; Deutsch and Gerard, 1955), on the other this also seems to occur in
presence of uncertainty and ambiguous tasks (Sherif, 1935). Whenever the correct
answer is not evident, there is a higher probability to rely on the majority, even if
others’ opinion is not completely in line with our attitude. In fact, people who hold
dissenting opinions have been reported to not express those to the group (Asch,
1956; Wilder & Allen, 1978). Thus, in order to get a dissenting individual exposing
his/her position, facilitating conditions must be created. Research has indicated that
social support for non-conformity reduces the tendency to conform. Exposure to a
dissenting minority increases the probability for the individual to express an opinion
far from the general consensus (Allen, 1975; Clark III, 1990; Mugny & Pérez, 1991;
Nemeth & Chiles, 1988; Papastamou, 1986).
Conformity to a group decision does not only depend on the level of agreement
of its components, whereas the presence of a leader has an equally powerful impact
(Hollander, 1958). The perception of power indeed can increase the probability
to conform; we embrace the others’ opinions and decisions when the suggestion
comes from a stereotypically perceived authority and we perceive it can exert some
control over our outcomes (Fiske & Berdahl, 2007). This perception of power and
authority seems to have its bases on the human tendency to associate authority
to human body features, with higher power represented by a more formidable
body (Lukaszewski, Simmons, Anderson, & Roney, 2016; Murray, 2014). From a
biological and evolutionary point of view, exemplars showing physical strength are
considered the best candidates for the continuum of the species, thus a leadership
and conductive role becomes more appropriate. A large body of research suggests
that people allocate higher social status to more physically formidable men (Blaker
& Van Vugt, 2014; Von Rueden, 2014). Moreover, there is evidence of an implicit
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mental association between physical size and social rank (Duguid & Goncalo, 2012;
Yap, Mason, & Ames, 2013). In particular, height has been associated with leadership
roles. Recent research has demonstrated that taller individuals are associated with
perceived intelligence, leadership ability, and occupational success (Blaker et al.,
2013; Murray & Schmitz, 2011; Re et al., 2012; Stulp, Buunk, Verhulst, & Pollet, 2015).
This chapter discusses and analyses the emergence of leader conformity and
deception in HRI. Specifically, the following question has been posed: would people
accept a robotic leader and conform to it? As we will be surrounded by an increasing
amount of robots, it is important to understand how these agents influence our
decisions, and whether people trust them. The robot persuasive power of changing
people’s behaviour has already been established, from education (Bertel, 2016) to
motivational situations (Nakagawa et al., 2013) and health care (Orji & Moffatt, 2018).
Robots seem to be persuasive also in giving suggestions (Chidambaram, Chiang,
& Mutlu, 2012), as well as convincing people to donate money (Siegel, Breazeal, &
Norton, 2009). Similarly to persuasion, conformity causes someone to change his/her
behaviour, but without showing direct intent to do so. It is therefore expected that
a group of robots would be able to provoke conformity in their interactions with
people.
Although some attempt to study group conformity in HRI has been performed
in the past by using variations of the Asch’s experiment (Beckner, Rácz, Hay,
Brandstetter, & Bartneck, 2016; Brandstetter et al., 2014; Shiomi & Hagita, 2016),
results did not show any reliable conformity effect towards robots. One of the
possible explanations is suggested to be the lack of social interaction between the
participants and the robots. Interestingly, in a recent word-association experiment
(Salomons, van der Linden, Strohkorb Sebo, & Scassellati, 2018), the participants and
a group of robots were asked to choose a card that best represented an administered
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word. The participants were assigned to a control condition, in which they did not
see the robots answer, and an experimental one, in which they were exposed to the
robots initial choice. Comparisons of the two groups showed an increased tendency
to conform to the robots decision in the experimental condition.
Previous experiments in HRI have then partially replicated the group conforming
effect, however, no studies have investigated further under which circumstances
we prefer to conform to the robot leader decision, and in which people prefer to
deviate. This chapter aims to further investigate human capabilities to apply and
extend social rules to non-human agents. This would not only have implications
on the definition of robot acceptance but can also contribute to the knowledge of
human social cognition.
In two experiments, participants played the Economic Investment Game as part of
a group made of robots. In the first experiment participants played with a team of two
robots, one ’leader’ and one ’follower’. To investigate under which circumstances
participants would follow the leader opinion or take an individual decision, the
agreement of the follower with the leader decision has been manipulated. Participants
were asked to take an investment decision on a banker, after observing their robotic
confederates investing their money. The similarity between the leader and the
participants’ investment was the main measure of conformity and was hypothesised
to change with the follower consensus to the leader. Moreover, considering previous
literature on the benefits of physical features on leadership perception, the role of
height has been investigated by using two robots, the tall Pepper and the little NAO,
which were randomly assigned to the role of the leader and the follower. Participants
were expected to follow more frequently the Pepper leader than the NAO leade.
However, this ’height effect’ was expected to affect conformity only when the follower
dissented with the leader. Results from previous chapters demonstrated, in fact,
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that robots physical attributes can influence participants’ performance especially
in hostile conditions. Therefore, in this study, participants’ conformity was not
expected to change when the robotic follower agreed with the leader. On the opposite,
participants were expected to show higher conformity to the Pepper leader over the
NAO when the robotic follower was disagreeing.
Although physical strength is associated with leadership perception, other
characteristics seem to influence it as well. Among these, leader prototypicality is
reported to affect leader credibility (e.g., Hais, Hogg, and Duck, 1997). According to
the Social Identity Theory of Leadership (Hogg, 2001), leaders whose characteristics
match the characteristics that typify their group, are assumed to be perceived as
more effective. In other words, the more the leader is perceived to embody the group
identity, the wider his/her influence will spread to the followers.
To test this hypothesis, a second experiment was conducted, in which a NAO
robot follower, always faithful to the leader, was introduced to the team. Here the
tall Pepper robot would become a minority. In this second experiment, participants
interacted with a larger group of robots in which one follower always accepted the
leader suggestions and the other showed some defective attitude. Considering the
majority of NAO robots, the previous ’height effect’ was hypothesised to be replaced
by a ’numerosity prototypical effect’: participants would prefer to follow the leader
whenever it was a NAO than a Pepper, because of its similarity with the rest of the
group. However, considering again previous chapters results on anthropomorphism,
this effect was expected to emerge only when one of the followers dissented with
the leader.
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60 individuals aged between 19 and 30 years old (50 female and 9 male; mean age =
19.88 years, SD = 1.73 years) participated in the study. All participants were naïve
as to the purpose of the investigation and gave informed written consent of their
willingness to participate. All participants were native British English speakers, they
were right-handed and reported normal hearing and no language or neurological
impairments. Familiarity or any previous experience with robots was the main
exclusion criteria, which was assessed during the recruitment phase.
6.2.2 Procedure
Investment game
The participants were seated in front of a NAO and a Pepper robot. A touchscreen
monitor placed between the participants and the robots displayed the game. The
participants were instructed to be part of the same team as the robots, playing against
a virtual opponent, called "banker", whose decisions were indicated on the centre of
the screen (Figure 6.1). The goal of the game was to earn as much money as possible
from the banker. Each player started with a notional sum of 10 ECU at the beginning
of every round of the game.
The game started with the leader robot introducing itself, underlying its leading
role and then introducing the other robot (called "follower"). After that, the leader
declared its investment choice (e.g. leader invested 6 ECU) and directed its attention
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Fig. 6.1 Group Investment Game display for Experiment 1
to the follower, which in turn chose how much to invest (e.g. follower invested 4
ECU). After both robots invested, the participants would decide their amount to
invest (e.g. participant invested 4 ECU). The amounts chose by the players were
summed, tripled and invested to the virtual banker (6 + 4 + 4 = 14 * 3 = 42 ECU),
which in turn decided the returns (e.g. 42 * 0.2= 8.4 ECU). To increase the cooperation
between the players, punishment has been included. This has been calculated as the
absolute difference between the leader investment and the average investment of the
remaining players (6 - 4 = 2 ECU) and subtracted from the banker payoff (8.4 - 2 =
6.4 ECU). In this way, the larger was the difference between the players’ choices, the
higher was the punishment they received. Finally, the amount returned was equally
split between the three members of the group (6.4 / 3 = 2.1 ECU to each player). The
virtual banker was programmed to return between 0 % and 30 % of the received
amount at each round.
The display placed in front of the participants showed 11 numbered buttons, that
participants could press to indicate the amount of money they wanted to invest in
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each round. The screen also showed how much money all players were making
(Figure 6.1). These buttons were called "bank" and were summing all the money the
players were earning separately. The total amount earned by the participants at the
end of each game was converted to British Pounds, at a rate of 30 ECU = £0.10 and
the sum of what they earned in the two games was paid to them at the end of the
experiment.
To make the interaction more natural, the robots performed a well-organised
turn-taking conversation during the game (e.g. leader looking at the follower while
asking it to invest, both robots turning their attention to the participant during his/her
turn) as well as congruent postures, hand gestures and arm movements. This has
been achieved by using the ALAnimatedSpeech module (http://doc.aldebaran.com/2-
1/naoqi/audio/alanimatedspeech.html). For a complete description of the game, a
detailed timeline is reported in Figure 6.2.
The number of rounds was not known to the participants. Each participant
engaged in two blocks of rounds. In the first block, the robots were programmed to
take similar decisions, so that the follower investment was always close to the leader
choice (collaborative condition). Specifically, the investment was always a number
between 6 and 10 for both robots. In order to check any differences, t-tests between
the two robots investments have been performed and no significant effect has been
found (ps > .05). In the second block, the follower changed its investment strategy
and stopped conforming with the leader decisions (non collaborative condition). In
this case, the follower investment was programmed to be always a number between
0 and 5, and always at least 3 ECU lower than the leader investment. In order to
avoid any interference during the game, the participants and the robots were left
alone in the room. Nevertheless, the experimenter could still monitor the game from







”I think we should invest X.
What do you think guys?”
Leader
Gaze on Follower
Follower declares its decision
Collaborative Condition







Leader summarises all investments
wait 1-2 sec
Leader declares the return
Non collaborative condition
Follower doesn’t agree with leader
1 sec wait
Fig. 6.2 Timeline of the group Investment Game with one leader and one follower.
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The experiment was counterbalanced in a 2 (leader: Pepper or NAO) between
subject and a 2 (follower: collaborative, non collaborative) within subject design.
Questionnaires
Four questionnaires were used as secondary measures to the main game task.
Three short scales measured likeability, trust, and credibility (Goldberg et al., 2006;
McCroskey & Young, 1981; Reysen, 2005). In addition, Bartneck et al. (2008)
questionnaire was used to measure a range of HRI factors (anthropomorphism,
animacy, likeability, perceived intelligence and perceived safety). Participants filled




One participant did not complete both game blocks and was excluded from the
analyses. Participants’ tendency to follow the leader has been defined as pre f erence
index, which has been calculated by comparing the participants’ investment decision
to both the leader and the follower decisions and by applying a binary categorical as
follow:
Pre f erence− Index1
 if (P−L) ≤ (P−F) = 0if (P−L) > (P−F) = 1 (6.1)
1where P is participants’ investment, L is leader investment and F is the follower investment
124
6.2 Experiment 1
In each round, this would be represented as a binary categorical value, set to 1
if the participants’ choice was closer to the leader decision than the follower, and
0 if their choice was equally distant from both players or closer to the follower.
A logistic mixed-effects model was fitted to the data using backwards stepwise
selection, with preference index as the dependent variable, leader (NAO/Pepper),
follower (collaborative/non collaborative), and game turn (the 20 rounds of the
game) as independent variables and participant id as a random factor. Post-hoc
comparisons were assessed using t-tests and Bonferroni’s correction was applied
when needed. Odds ratios are reported on Table 6.1.
Table 6.1 Odds ratios and confidence intervals for Experiment 1.
Odds Ratio C.I.
Follower-Non collaborative 0.68 0.47-0.98
Game turn 0.97 0.95-0.99
Leader-Pepper:Follower-Collaborative 1.11 0.79-1.56
Leader-Pepper:Follower-Non Collaborative 0.85 0.57-1.26
Leader-NAO:Follower-Collaborative:Game turn 1.00 0.97-1.03
Leader-NAO:Follower-Non Collaborative:Game turn 0.94 0.91-0.98
Leader-Pepper:Follower-Collaborative:Game turn 0.99 0.96-1.02
A significant main effect of follower has been found (χ2(1) = 99.53,p < .001);
participants’ preference for the leader choice was significantly higher whenever
the follower was collaborative (mean = 0.30) compared to the non collaborative
condition (mean = 0.12). Game turn affected participants’ preference as well
(χ2(1) = 5.48,p = .019) showing a decrease of leader consensus over time. Leader had
no effect on participants’ choices (p > .05).
The two-way interaction between leader and follower was significant (χ2(2) =
7.63,p= .022). Participants did not discriminate between the two leaders in the collab-
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Fig. 6.4 Preference index variations during the game for NAO and Pepper leaders in the
collaborative (top) and non collaborative (bottom) conditions.
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orative condition (p > .05). In the non collaborative condition, instead, participants
preferred the Pepper leader to the NAO (p = .045) (Figure 6.3).
Finally, a significant three-way interaction between leader, follower and game
turn has been found (χ2(3) = 10.86,p = .012). Post-hoc analyses for the collaborative
condition revealed a main game turn effect (χ2(1) = 21.19,p < .001), showing a gradual
decrease of leader consensus in the last rounds of the game. No significant interaction
between leader and game turn has been found (p > .05). For the non collaborative
condition, there was a significant main effect for game turn (χ2(1) = 27.59,p < .001) and
a significant two-way interaction between leader and game turn (χ2(1) = 11.31,p< .001).
After an initial decrease in the first rounds, the preference for the NAO leader was
maintained constantly lower than the Pepper leader (Figure 6.4).
Questionnaires Results
For each scale, a linear mixed-effects model fitted to the data, with scale as the
dependent variable, robot (NAO/Pepper) and role (follower/leader), as independent
variables and participant id as a random factor. As shown in Table 6.3, role had
an effect for the Trust, Anthropomorphism, Animacy, Likeability and Intelligence
scales. For the former four scales, higher ratings for the leader than the follower are
reported. The opposite result has been found for the Intelligence scale. The type
of robot affected only Safety scale, with higher ratings for Pepper robot. No other
significant differences have been found (ps > .05).
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Table 6.3 Results from questionnaires analyses of Experiment 1.
Robot Role Robot By Role
Likeability n.s. n.s. n.s.
Trust n.s. χ2(1) = 8.25,p = .004 n.s.
Credibility n.s. n.s. n.s.
Godspeed Questionnaires
Anthropomorphism n.s. χ2(1) = 9.77,p = .002 n.s.
Animacy n.s. χ2(1) = 4.85,p = .028 n.s.
Likeability n.s. χ2(1) = 13.36,p < .001 n.s.
Intelligence n.s. χ2(1) = 12.81,p < .001 n.s.




From a behavioural point of view, results indicate that participants conformed to
the leader when supported by the follower. On the other hand, when the follower
changed its strategy, the participants preferred to take an autonomous decision
and invested a different amount of money. The questionnaires, however, reported
participants to prefer the leader over the follower, thus indicating that they recognised
the leader authority. These results show that people could be able to apply human
conformity rules to a group of robots and would entitle a leadership role to a robotic
agent. Furthermore, when the follower agreed with the leader, participants did not
discriminate between the two types of leaders. Nevertheless, when a disagreement
between the robots emerges, the participants preferred to follow the taller Pepper
leader. These results give confirmation to the hypothesis that height is a factor
capable of increasing the sense of leadership and can be transferred to non-human
agents.
On a second experiment, the investigation of leader conformity has been extended,
by increasing the number of robotic followers. Participants played with three robots,
one of which always taking the leader side. In this way, a wider exploration of the
role of a dissenting minority can also be performed. Moreover, the prototypicality of
the leader has been investigated in order to measure the effect of physical strength
in leadership perception. This has been achieved by adding a second NAO robot to
the team. In a group of small robots, would a small leader be preferred (because of
its resemblance to the team) or would participants still follow the taller leader?
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61 individuals between 19 and 30 years old (51 female and 10 male; mean age
= 19.82 years, SD = 2.26 years) participated in the study. All participants were
naïve as to the purpose of the investigation and gave informed written consent to
participate in the study. All participants were native British English speakers, they
were right-handed and reported normal hearing and no language or neurological
impairments. Familiarity or any previous experience with robots was the main
exclusion criteria, which was assessed during the recruitment phase.
Procedure
The procedure was the same as for Experiment 1. Alternatively, a NAO and a Pepper
played the leader role, while the other was assigned to the follower role. The novelty
of this experiment was the introduction of a new robotic follower, another NAO robot.
This second follower was programmed to always conform and follow the leader
decisions, thus always choosing a similar amount to invest in both experimental
blocks. Moreover, a robotic NAO banker was positioned on the right corner of the
room and monitored the game from its own computer (Figure 6.5).
Like for the previous experiment, the leader made its choice first, then asked the
two followers to decide their investments. The order to which the two followers
made their choice was randomised throughout the game. The participants would
invest their money once all the other players took their decisions. The amounts of
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Fig. 6.5 Group Investment Game setup for Experiment 2.
all the four players were summed, tripled and sent to the robotic banker, which then
decided the returns. As for Experiment 1, a punishment for not agreeing with the
leader has been introduced and included the second follower investment as well.
In this case, the average investment of the players (e.g. 5 + 6 + 4 = 15 / 3 = 5 ECU)
was subtracted from the leader investment (e.g. 6 ECU, thus punishment is 6 - 5 = 1
ECU) and then subtracted from the returned amount.
The interaction between the robots has been manipulated in terms of gestures
and speech in order to resemble as natural as possible. Moreover, the monitor in
front of the participants was updated with the second follower "bank”. In order to
not interfere with the experiment, the banker was mute and immobile for all the
duration of the game. For a complete description of the game, a detailed timeline is
reported in Figure 6.6.
The experiment was counterbalanced in a 2 (leader: Pepper or NAO) between
subject and a 2 (follower: collaborative, non collaborative) within subject design.
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”I think we should invest X.
What do you think guys?”
Leader
Gaze on Followers
Followers declare their decision
Collaborative Condition
Follower 1 agrees with leader
1 Sec Wait







Leader summarises all investments
Leader Gaze on Banker
Wait 1-2 sec
Leader Gaze on participants
declares the return
Non collaborative condition
Follower 1 agrees with leader
1 Sec Wait
Follower 2 doesn’t agree with leader
1 Sec Wait





A logistic mixed-effects model was fitted to the data using backwards stepwise
selection, with preference index as the dependent variable, leader (NAO/Pepper),
follower (collaborative/non collaborative), and game turn (the 20 rounds of the
game) as independent variables and participant id as the random factor. Post-hoc
comparisons were assessed using t-tests and Bonferroni’s correction was applied
when needed. Odds ratios are reported in Table 6.4.
Table 6.4 Odds ratios and confidence intervals for Experiment 2.
Odds Ratio C.I.
Follower-Non collaborative 0.69 0.59-0.82
Game turn 0.97 0.96-0.98
Leader-Pepper:Follower-Collaborative 1.03 0.84-1.27
Leader-Pepper:Follower-Non Collaborative 0.71 0.57-0.90
A significant main effect of follower has been found (χ2(1) = 76.52,p < .001); partic-
ipants; preference for the leader choice was significantly higher in the collaborative
condition (mean = 0.28) than the non collaborative one (mean = 0.14). Game turn
affected participants’ preference as well (χ2(1) = 26.93,p < .001), which was gradually
reduced over time. Leader had no effect on participants’ choices (p > .05).
A significant two-way interaction between leader and follower was found
(χ2(2) = 10.89,p = .004). Participants did not discriminate between the two leaders
in the collaborative condition (p > .05). In the non collaborative condition, instead,
participants preferred the NAO leader to the Pepper (p = .011) (Figure 6.7). No other
significant interactions have been found (ps > .05).
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Fig. 6.7 Conformity index for NAO and Pepper leaders in the collaborative and non
collaborative conditions.
Questionnaires Results
For each scale, a linear mixed effect model was fitted to the data, with scale as the
dependent variable, robot (NAO/Pepper) and role (follower/leader) as independent
variables and participant id as the random factor. As shown in Table 6.6, the type
of robot had an effect only for the Likeability scale, with higher ratings for the
Pepper. The role of the robot, instead, affected all questionnaires with the exception
for Anthropomorphism. For Likeability, Trust, Credibility, Animacy and Safety,
participants preferred the leader over the follower, while instead this was rated
more intelligent than the leader. The interaction between role and robot was not
significant for any of the scales.
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Table 6.6 Results of the questionnaires analyses for Experiment 2.
Robot Role Robot By Role
Likeability n.s. χ2(1) = 31.48,p < .001 n.s.
Trust n.s. χ2(1) = 32.15,p < .001 n.s.
Credibility n.s. χ2(1) = 5.90,p = .015 n.s.
Godspeed Questionnaires
Anthropomorphism n.s. n.s. n.s.
Animacy n.s. χ2(1) = 4.26,p = .039 n.s.
Likeability n.s. χ2(1) = 79.73,p < .001 n.s.
Intelligence n.s. χ2(1) = 11.78,p < .001 n.s.
Safety n.s. χ2(1) = 8.74,p = .003 n.s.
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6.3.3 Discussion
The results from Experiment 2 confirmed the previous conformity effect. Participants
followed the leader when supported by its follower. On the opposite, when a
minority dissented, participants preferred investing a different amount of money
from the one suggested by the leader. Moreover, questionnaires again reported
participants to prefer the leader over the follower. Furthermore, investigations on
the role of prototypicality showed no effect on the collaborative condition. Like in
the previous experiment, when all the followers agreed with the leader, participants
did not discriminate between the two types of leader. However, when one of the
followers dissented from the majority strategy, participant preferred to follow the
little NAO leader than the taller Pepper. These results sustain the hypothesis that a
leader showing similar features to its group has higher probabilities of influencing
people’s decisions.
Finally, to fully understand the role of the follower on leadership perception,
an analysis comparing the two experiments has been performed. This has been
done by introducing a new variable called "position", which refers to the amount of
consensus reached by the leader. While in the first experiment the leader could fall
in a minority position with only one follower, in the second experiment the leader
moved to a majority position thanks to the help of a second faithful follower. This
analysis would also give some insight into the role of height and prototypicality on
leadership.
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6.4 Comparisons of experiment 1 and 2
A logistic mixed-effects model was fitted to the data using backwards stepwise
selection, with preference index as the dependent variable, leader (NAO/Pepper),
follower (collaborative/non collaborative), game turn (the 20 rounds of the game)
and position (minority/majority) as independent variables and participant id as a
random factor. Post-hoc comparisons were assessed using t-tests and Bonferroni’s
correction was applied when needed.
6.4.1 Results
Game results
Table 6.7 Odds ratios and confidence intervals for the final comparison analysis.
Odds Ratio C.I.
Follower-Non collaborative 0.57 0.37-0.68
Game turn 0.97 0.47-0.97
Leader-NAO:Follower-Collaborative:Position-Majority 0.94 0.36-1.14
Leader-NAO:Follower-Non Collaborative:Position-Majority 1.13 0.35-1.41
Leader-NAO:Follower-Collaborative:Position-Minority 0.98 0.34-1.20
Leader-NAO:Follower-Non Collaborative:Position-Minority 0.71 0.34-0.91
Leader-Pepper:Follower-Collaborative:Position-Majority 0.97 0.36-1.17
Leader-NAO:Follower-Non Collaborative:Position-Majority 0.81 0.35-1.01
A significant main effect of follower has been found (χ2(1) = 183.59,p< .001); partic-
ipants’ preference for the leader choice was significantly higher in the collaborative
condition (mean = 0.29) than in the non collaborative one (mean = 0.13). Game turn
affected participants’ preference (χ2(1) = 73.58,p < .001), with a decrease of preference
over time. Leader and position had no effect on the preference index (ps > .05).
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Collaborative Non Collaborative


















Fig. 6.8 Conformity index in the non collaborative condition for NAO and Pepper leaders in
majority (light blue) and minority (dark blue) positions.
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A significant three-way interaction between leader, follower and position emerged
(χ2(6) = 22.42,p= .001). As showed in Figure 6.8, for the collaborative follower, position
and leader had no effect (ps > .05). For the non collaborative follower, previous results
have been confirmed; the NAO leader collected more consensus than the Pepper
when in majority position (0.18 vs 0.11, p = .002). On the opposite, participants
preferred to agree with the Pepper leader than the NAO when in minority position
(0.15 vs 0.09, p = .008). Finally, the NAO leader reached higher consensus when in
majority than in minority position (0.18 vs 0.09, p = .002), while for the Pepper leader
no differences on position have been found (0.11 vs 0.15, p > .050).
Questionnaires Results
Table 6.8 Results for questionnaires analyses in the final comparison.
Robot Role Position
Likeability n.s. χ2(1) = 8.96,p = .003 n.s.
Trust n.s. χ2(1) = 10.92,p < .001 n.s.
Credibility n.s. n.s. n.s.
Godspeed Questionnaires
Anthropomorphism n.s. n.s. n.s.
Animacy n.s. n.s. n.s.
Likeability n.s. χ2(1) = 26.82,p < .001 χ
2
(1) = 6.67,p = .009
Intelligence χ2(1) = 7.77,p = .010 n.s. n.s.
Safety n.s. n.s. n.s.
For each scale, a linear mixed effect model fitted to the data, with scale as
the dependent variable, robot (NAO/Pepper), role (follower/leader) and position
(minority/majority) as independent variables and participant id as a random factor.
As shown in Table 6.8, the type of role had an effect for the Likeability and Trust
scales, with higher ratings for the leader than the follower. The type of robot affected
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only the Intelligence scale, with higher ratings for the Pepper robot. The type of























































Fig. 6.9 Participants’ ratings for follower and leader roles in majority and minority positions,
for Likeability (panel A), Trust (panel B), Intelligence (panle C) and Safety (panel D) scales.
A significant interaction between role and position was found for both Likeability
(χ2(1) = 32.04,p < .001; χ
2
(2) = 73.44,p < .001), Trust (χ
2
(2) = 33.89,p < .001), Intelligence
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(χ2(6) = 20.77,p = .002) and Safety (χ
2
(3) = 18.73,p < .001). Likeability, Trust, and Safety
revealed higher preferences for the leader over the follower when in majority position
(ps < .05). Moreover, for the Safety scale, the role of the leader in the minority was
perceived significantly less safe than in the majority (p = .017). The Intelligence scale
had higher ratings for the follower over the leader when in the majority (p = .019).
Finally, the interaction between robot and position was found to be significant
for Likeability (χ2(3) = 11.76,p = .001), with higher ratings for the NAO robot in the
majority position (p = .002).
6.5 Discussion
In this Chapter, leader conformity dynamics in HRI have been investigated, by
posing the following questions: do we conform and deviate to robots in the same
way we do with other humans? How does the support to a robotic leader affect
conformity and deviation? In order to answer these questions, the participants’
tendency to rely on the investment decision of a robotic leader have been studied.
Specifically, two conformity conditions have been created, one in which the leader
received the followers’ support and one in which a follower dissented from the leader.
This has been done to investigate under which circumstances participants would
follow a robot leader. Results indicated that humans can follow a robotic majority in
the same way they follow a human majority. Whenever the followers conformed to
the leader investment decision, participants agreed in choosing a similar monetary
amount, even when the choice of the leader was strategically weak (e.g. investing
a high amount of money when the payoff was low). These results confirmed that
humans can ascribe social in-group competences to robots and demonstrated that
people apply to robots the same responsive behaviour they apply to their similars,
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like accepting the majority decision as a valid alternative (Asch & Guetzkow, 1951;
Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Martin, Thomas, Hewstone, & Gardikiotis, 2018). Since
conformity derives from the need for approval and social acceptance, the present
results indicate that humans are capable of transferring these approval needs to
non-human entities. That is, once they feel part of a group, regardless of the nature
of its members, they act in accordance with the group rules in order to be accepted.
Exposure to a robotic dissenter decreased the probability to conform. When the
robot follower showed some refrain in agreeing with the leader and started defecting,
the number of times participants agreed with the leader dropped drastically. This is
in line with previous literature on minority exposure (Allen, 1975; Clark III, 1990;
Mugny & Pérez, 1991; Nemeth & Chiles, 1988; Papastamou, 1986) and confirmed the
human capability to include robots in their social environment and apply to them
human-human interactive rules.
In a second experiment, participants played the investment game with a team
formed of one leader and two followers, one of which always accepting the leader
choice and the other showing defective tendency. This was done to investigate
a possible ’majority effect’ on leader conformity. While in the first experiment
a real majority consensus was not reached during the second block, in the latter
experiment the leader could always count the support of one follower. In the second
experiment, participants were expected to show a lower tendency to deviate from
the majority. Behavioural data did not support this hypothesis. Instead, the same
result of the first experiment has been obtained, showing that the numerosity of
the team does not affect deviation from leader conformity. The lack of this effect
can be due to the structure of the game: since the leader was always suggesting
a wrong strategy (investing a high amount of money on a selfish banker), it is
possible that participants exposed to a non collaborative follower decided to dissent
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regardless of the amplitude of consensus. Analysis of game turn, in fact, showed
a gradual decrease of conformity over time, thus suggesting that they realised the
weakness of the leader strategy. However, questionnaires partially confirmed the
numerosity hypothesis. Participants rated higher the leader in both experiments,
but it rated more likeable, trustworthy and safe than when in minority. Overall,
these results indicated that, even if conformity was not behaviourally affected by a
larger consensus on the leader, participants still recognised its powerful position,
especially when supported by more followers.
Nevertheless, some limitations on the structure of the game block should be
mentioned. Since the aim of the study was to investigate participants’ reaction to
a dissenting minority, they were initially exposed to a block with a collaborative
follower and then with a non collaborative one. This was done to give the participants
the impression that the follower initially recognised the role of the leader and tried to
comply to it, but after a first try, it decided to play an independent strategy. Although
a follower that initially dissents to the group and later decides to agree with the
leader might sound unusual, changing the order of the block could reveal other
interesting insights. Would participants immediately dissent to the leader? If so,
would they keep dissenting when all the others are obeying to the leader?
Another hypothesis of this study regarded the role of the leader features in
conformity formation, for which height and prototypicality have been considered.
Since height has been reported as one of the main contributors to the perception of
leadership, in the first experiment comparisons between a tall Pepper robot and a
small NAO have been performed. Results supported the hypothesis that a taller
robotic leader is a more influencing presence, but only when the follower deviates
from its decision.
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Although height has a great impact on leader acceptance, it has been also
demonstrated that carrying similar features to the followers can be equally important.
In the second experiment, prototypicality has been investigated by introducing
another NAO follower, thus expecting participants to prefer the small robot as a
leader over the tall Pepper. Analyses showed that participants agreed more often
with the NAO leader in the second block than the Pepper leader. These results
are in line with recent studies demonstrating that the leader prototypicality affects
conformity and effectiveness perception of leadership (e.g. Barreto and Hogg, 2018).
The data from both experiments support the previous evidence on the selective
effect of anthropomorphic features in HRI. Whenever the robot behaviour follows
people’s expectations (e.g. the follower agrees with the leader) the features of the
robot leader are not a necessary characteristic to improve conformation. However,
when a robot does not follow the expected rules, uncertainty on the behaviour that
participants should choose arises and stereotypical features of the leader become a
significant impactful variable on their final decision. This hypothesis has been further
supported by the final analysis. The comparisons between the two experiments
showed no differences of conformity for Pepper leader in the two groups. Participants
were equally conforming to Pepper leader independently from the number of NAOs
surrounding it. On the opposite, the tendency to conform to the NAO leader
drastically increased when surrounded by other NAOs. The leader prototypically
affected participants’ conformity, replacing the anthropomorphic height effect of
the first experiment. Likeability questionnaire confirmed the behavioural results;
participants gave higher ratings to the NAO robot in the large group. It could be
concluded that prototypicality is a stronger factor in affecting conformity to the
leader. However, it should be considered that a comparison with a majority of
Pepper robots has not been performed. Considering the results here reported it can
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be hypothesised that a Pepper leader, guiding a majority of other Peppers, would
benefit from both height and similarity contributions and further increase conformity
over a majority of NAO robots.
Nevertheless, the role of the banker should be considered. In the second
experiment, in fact, the role of the banker was applied to a real NAO robot, whereas
in the first study the barker was confined to a virtual presence. It is then plausible to
hypothesise that a NAO robot could strengthen the prototypicality effect. Stemming
from this, future study should investigate the role of a physical Pepper banker in a
group of Pepper robots to better understand how both height and prototypicality
affect human conformity to robots. Furthermore, the role of a human follower/leader
among a group of robots, give some useful insights on the development of in-group
feelings.
6.6 Conclusion
Humans can develop an in-group feeling towards a group of robots and can
congruently behave in order to be socially accepted by them. Here, our understanding
of the psychology of HRI has been extended by showing that humans conform to
robots in the same way they do with other humans. People follow a robot leader
whenever it is supported by the group members, and prefer changing their attitude
whenever exposed to a dissenting robotic agent. Moreover, humans apply to a robot
leader the same stereotypical expectations they apply to other humans. They associate
height to the perception of power and authority as well as they prefer engaging
with a leader that embodies the same characteristics of the followers. However,
this happens only when a dissenting minority appears. This demonstrates that the
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physical features of a robot can affect social interactions under specific conditions,




Well we know where we’re going
But we don’t know where we’ve been
And we know what we’re knowing
But we can’t say what we’ve seen
And we’re not little children
And we know what we want
And the future is certain
Give us time to work it out.
Road to Nowhere
Talking Heads
This chapter brings together the work that has been reported within this thesis to
show how the main findings relate to the five research questions it has addressed.
The key contributions of this research to HRI are discussed and a collection of
suggestions for future avenues of research are outlined.
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7.1 When do we cooperate with robots?
The aim of this thesis was to explore how humans accept robots and cooperate
with them. Due to their potential raising presence in the most diverse fields, from
industry to elderly care, the need for reducing the social distance between humans
and robotic agents has become compelling.
Robot trust and acceptance have been addressed as two of the main issues in
the last decades of studies and anthropomorphism has been entitled as the most
influential factor among all the different theories and hypotheses. Moreover, with
the evolution of new interactive scenarios, the concept of anthropomorphism has
not anymore been limited to the physical features of robots but has absorbed also
social and behavioural competencies that can increase the chances of including
robots in everyday human life. Interestingly, recent studies have also suggested that
anthropomorphism can be an instrument with limited success. There is evidence, in
fact, that under certain circumstances human-likeness is not only a useless instrument
but can also negatively impact the quality of the interaction.
Finally, future inclusion of robots into many human environments has also led to
the necessity of reviewing the concept of HRC, moving from a robotic subordinate
to a real "au pair" view of the interaction.
The aim of this thesis was to explore how we extend the use of social collaborative
cues to robots and what are the necessary anthropomorphic requirements for that
extension. Specifically, the following questions have been raised:
• Can anthropomorphic stereotype activation affect the robot credibility?
• How does trust in HRI evolve over time and under what specific circumstances
anthropomorphism increases trust in HRI?
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• Can we cooperate with robots as we cooperate with other humans? What is
the role of anthropomorphism in affecting cooperation?
• Can people choose to strategically imitate a robot and how would anthropo-
morphism influence social learning in HRI?
• Would humans conform to a robotic leader or would prefer to follow a
dissenting minority? Which features should a robotic leader embed to be
trusted?
7.1.1 Can anthropomorphic stereotype activation affect the robot
credibility?
First impressions matter even with robots and anthropomorphism can help humans
in accepting a robot at their first encounter. As suggested by the literature, human-
likeness is one of the most powerful instrument we have to influence people beliefs
and judgments on robots. Moreover, it has been largely demonstrated that human-
like resemblance is capable of activating the "you look like me, so I like you"
stereotype, which consequently opens the path to new interactive possibilities.
Nevertheless, research in HRI was always focused on the formation of people’s
first impression and on what a possible positive impression might depend without
testing whether we can learn to like and accept a robotic agent. As demonstrated in
Chapter 2, a robot credibility can be increased through stereotype activation and
can be extended to other exemplars of the same category. On the basis of the results
reported, the previous "you look like me, so I like you" stereotype can be rephrased as
a "you look like that nice robot, so I like you too" stereotype. People do not only seem
to prefer to interact with an anthropomorphic robot, but they also learn to equally
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appreciate a machine-like agent because of the pleasant impression and experience
they had in the past with a human-like robot. Moreover, the opposite reaction can
be activated too. A first negative impression is capable of reducing credibility and
any positive feelings in a robot that usually provides a sense of familiarity a trust.
This stereotype generalisation effect responds to the same HHI pattern, thus
demonstrates that a sort of human-like interaction with robots is possible, although
some limitations are inevitable. In fact, it appears that only the physical side of
anthropomorphism can be affected by stereotype activation. Nevertheless, non-
verbal cues appear to be only a human-like prerogative. A discrepancy, in fact,
between the robot look and its behaviour has been found to sort a negative impact
on the interaction outcome: a robot that looks like a machine can’t be associated
to a gaze shift or a head-nodding since these behaviours belong to a human entity.
Instead, they can be justified on an anthropomorphic robot and used as a way to
reduce social distance during the interaction.
Although this stereotype generalisation was consistent through two distinct
experiments, limitations might regard the physical features of the anthropomorphic
robots. In both experiments, in fact, the more humanlike robots may evoke childish
and playful feelings, thus influencing participants’ perception of the robots credibility.
Although it is expected to find a similar effect with an adult looking robot, future
research should investigate this credibility changes on different types of robots, in
order to further define the contours of stereotype activation in HRI.
150
7.1 When do we cooperate with robots?
7.1.2 How does trust in HRI evolve over time and under what
specific circumstances anthropomorphism increases trust in
HRI?
Trust is at the basis of cooperation. Therefore, improving the perception of trustwor-
thiness is at the basis of HRC research. While the attention on trust in HRI has always
been dedicated to the first impression in evoking a trustful feeling, little interested
has been paid on the fluctuations and modifications of trust over time. Studies
on Chapter 2 showed that impressions can be modified on the basis of previous
experience. In a similar way, trust in robots can be modified by experiencing an
interaction over time. Moreover, the enormous number of studies conducted in
the last decade has focused mostly on the factors affecting subjective and explicit
measures of trust and cooperation, while a behavioural implicit correlate has not
been fully investigated.
In Chapter 3, cooperation and trust have been implicitly measured by using the
Investment Game. Results indicated that people reciprocate trust with trust and
punishment with punishment, thus following the same rules of HHI. Participants
responded with high investments to generous returns and reduced the monetary
choice in case of low payoff. This correct strategical behaviour has been interpreted
as an intentional attribution process and the emergence of a sense of commitment
toward the robot. This could lead to the conclusion that once an entity is engaged in
interacting with a human, the human automatically applies human-social rules to
the interaction. This hypothesis was also confirmed by the explicit measures, for




If we are naturally led to include non-human agents in our environment, we need
to know how these agents should be and behave, in order to increase their acceptance.
For this reason, another aim of this thesis was to put order on the enormous list
of anthropomorphic factors affecting HRI, to establish which human-like features
are more desirable, and under what circumstances the "less is more" rule would
prevail. Chapter 2 results, in fact, have underlined the need to establish a threshold
above which socio-behavioural anthropomorphism is useless or even unfavourable
to the interaction. This borderline has been found on the payoff. Results on the
manipulation of anthropomorphic behaviour demonstrated that a natural voice, as
well as the capability to engage in joint attention, are desirable features that people
need whenever the payoff is low, but become ineffective features in the opposite
condition.
Thanks to this exploration of trust evolution over time, a limitation to our need of
projecting social competences to robots has been found to depend on our expectations.
As long as a robot fulfil our needs (as we usually expect), it is preferred to be confined
to the machine-like category. On the contrary, if a robot does not facilitate and
ameliorate our status, it better falls in the human-like category. Future studies,
however, should investigate the evolution of trust in HRI on a longer term. As the
different anthropomorphic features of the robot have shown specific patterns, it is
plausible to hypothesise some further variations over time.
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7.1.3 Can we cooperate with robots as we cooperate with other
humans? What is the role of anthropomorphism in affecting
cooperation?
The lack of research regarding the non-subordinate role of robots in HRI and the
increasing need to explore the boundaries of HRC have raised the question of
whether it is possible for robots to be included in social interactions as proper peers.
Proper acceptance and cooperation in HRI cannot be measured and investigated
if we still use robots as tools; acceptance comes from an ’au pair’ condition, thus
a proper measurement is still missing. Consequently, all the discoveries in terms
of anthropomorphism also need to be revised under the light of a new concept of
cooperation in HRI.
A peer may have motivations, preferences or intentions that can be different from
his/her partner. In the same way, if a robot is used as a peer, it should be endowed
with the same freedom of action, which could affect the outcome of the interaction,
such that the robot might not always be disposed to cooperate in a manner desirable
to the human partner. This can have severe implications on the human response,
which in turn, can reveal where the core of real acceptance lays.
In Chapter 4 participants engaged in a modified version of the Investment
Game in which they had to find a common decision regarding how much money
to invest in a robotic banker. Results indicated that a robot intention does affect
people subsequent choice to cooperate. Participants followed cooperative rules and
accepted the robot suggestions whenever it showed the willingness to collaborate
and the tendency to "meet halfway". On the opposite, the hostile behaviour of a robot
not seeking for any compromise, induced participants to refrain from cooperating.
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These results are important not only for showing eventually the existence of proper
cooperation in HRI, but they also demonstrate that people ascribe freedom of action
to a robot and respond to it as they respond to other humans. Specifically, people read
a robot non-collaborative intention as a real selfish attitude and adequately respond
to it. This demonstrates that HRI is not any more confined to the subordinated
machine-human interaction, but instead, robotic presence in everyday environments
could potentially be tolerated and would better the quality of the interaction. That
is, if we introduce a robot as a real companion, we could potentially treat it as a real
companion.
As previously discussed, a new concept of cooperation in HRI needs also to revise
the concept of anthropomorphism. Introduction of social cues (e.g. speaking, gaze
engagement and pointing) in this experiment, consolidated previous results on the
selective beneficial effect of anthropomorphism. Cooperation with a more socially
interactive robot was reported to increase collaboration in situations of low payoff.
On the opposite, a static robot was preferred with a high payoff. These results give
consistency to the ones obtained in Chapter 3, but more importantly, demonstrate
the incorrect usage of anthropomorphism in the last decades. Here, it appears that
human’s expectations about the robot play a major role in increasing/reducing the
effect of anthropomorphic perception. In light of these results, further investigations
on the role of the payoff are needed. As the payoffwas manipulated by a third entity,
it is reasonable to wonder whether a more or less anthropomorphic entity (in this
case a robotic banker) could further affect the level of cooperation.
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7.1.4 Can humans choose to strategically imitate a robot and how
would anthropomorphism influence social learning in HRI?
Once established that robots have the potential to be treated as peers by humans,
new social scenarios would open. Peer-to-peer cooperation has demonstrated that
the introduction of robots in every-day environments is possible and could lead to
positive outcomes. This also means that we ascribe to robots the ability to take the
correct decision. If we trust a robot to the point of properly cooperating with it and
accepting its suggestions, would we be willing to imitate its choices?
In Chapter 5, the variable of inequality has been included to test whether people
were able to draw from a robot behaviour to increase their success chances and
improve their status. In everyday human life, in fact, people are not treated all in the
same way and goods are not always distributed equally. This inequality often leads
people to imitate the most successful behaviour, hoping this would sort the same
positive effect for them. In this study, cooperation in HRI was shown to be affected
by the observation of a robot successful strategy. Although participants received a
low return by the banker, they increased their trust and investments. This has been
interpreted as an imitative response to the observation of the success obtained by
the robot playing next to them, for which the payoff was consistently higher. In
the same way humans do with other humans, participants invested their resources
and increased their trust in a risky situation, by hoping that the success obtained by
another agent could be achieved by them. These results could potentially broaden
the application of HRI. We might not only consider robots valuable helpers, but we
could also trust them to the point of copying their choices.
Another alternative explanation might also come from the participants’ willing-
ness to please the banker by increasing their monetary investment. As the interaction
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included a third party, it is advisable to further investigate this triadic relationship
before ultimately concluding that humans can imitate a robot strategy.
Finally, in Chapter 5 imitation was increased by the anthropomorphic behaviour
of the fellow to be imitated. This result has been obtained only in the most
disadvantageous condition for the participants. This means that humans can
potentially apply social learning strategies to a robotic agent and this disposition
can be notably increased when the agent is showing social competences.
Although some experimental limitations have been found, it appears that a robot
is potentially capable of influencing a human decision just by showing the benefits a
human can obtain by following its instructions. This evidence offers a wide range of
improvements in every field covered by HRC. Social learning, in fact, can stimulate
the production of socially desired behaviours from models. Hence, robots could
become one of these models in helping to generate social change. That is, we can
learn from robots (especially anthropomorphic ones) how to be better humans.
7.1.5 Would humans conform to a robotic leader or would prefer
to follow a dissenting minority? Which features should a
robotic leader embed to be trusted?
If robots can be reliable models in guiding human behaviour, thus an investigation
on the robotic capabilities in leading a group comes naturally. Cooperation between
humans is not confined to a dyadic interaction, while instead, an in-group feeling is
mostly responsible for people’s decisions. Consequently, in order to fully understand
the limits of cooperation in HRI, investigations in this direction are necessary. In
Chapter 6, the robotic leader consensus has been manipulated in order to estimate
participants’ willingness to conform to the general agreement or defecting to protect
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their investments. Results showed that people tend to respond to human-robot
dynamics by applying human-human social rules. As in HHI, they conformed to
the wrong decision of the group whenever the general consensus to the leader was
prevalent. On the other hand, as soon as a dissenting party took an autonomous
decision, people stood up and refused to conform. These results pushed once more
the boundaries of robots acceptance, demonstrating that we can also develop some
in-group feelings in HRI.
Investigations on the role of physical features on a robotic leader have been
performed, in order to understand how and when they affect participants’ conformity.
In a first experiment, the role of height as an expression of biological strength has been
investigated by comparing a Pepper with a NAO robot leader. In deciding whom to
follow, humans usually prefer the most powerful and resistant leader. This result
has been replicated with robots, thus demonstrating that the biological correlates of
leadership can be extended to HRI. However, this application is selectively associated
with the degree of leader consensus. Whenever all the components of the group
where consenting with the leader, its height was useless in influencing participants’
behaviour. On the opposite, when the leader found itself in a minority position,
participants’ preferences converged toward the taller leader.
Furthermore, in a second experiment, the role of prototypicality has been studied
by increasing the number of NAO robots in the team. In deciding whom to follow,
humans usually prefer the leader that mostly resembles the group. This result has
been replicated with robots, thus demonstrating once again that the human rules
of leadership preference can be extended to HRI. However, this application is once
again selectively associated with the degree of the leader consensus. Whenever all
the components of the group where consenting with the leader, its features were
useless. On the opposite, when the leader lost the general consensus, the NAO
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leader incarnated more similar features to the majority of the group, thus participants
preferences converged toward it.
Humans are social animals with a strong in-group necessity. Results of Chapter 6
demonstrate that we are capable of extending this need and developing a feeling of
belonging even with a group of robots and, once again, that anthropomorphism can
selectively increase this sense of connection. As the role of height and prototypicality
have been investigated, other features of the leader could affect the quality of the
interaction. Moreover, as limitations on the structure of the experiments appeared, it
is advisable to further investigate the role of the banker in increasing or reducing
participants’ conformity.
7.2 Limitations and future studies of Cooperation in
HRI
7.2.1 Investment Game
The Investment Game has been used in this thesis as the main behavioural mea-
surement of trust and cooperation. Although results indicated that the difficulty
of the task plays a key role in increasing or reducing participants’ tendency to
anthropomorphise a robot, this effect is confined to the type of payoff. In this sense,
it is necessary to extend this scenario to other types of tasks. Moreover, in this thesis
cooperation and trust have been mainly considered in terms of willingness to risk a
monetary loss. Studies on trust and cooperation in HRI should be extended to other
cooperative scenarios to broaden the results here reported. For example, Sandoval,
158
7.2 Limitations and future studies of Cooperation in HRI
Brandstetter, and Bartneck (2016) underlined the importance of including morally
ambiguous situations, like bribing, in the study of HRC.
7.2.2 Anthropomorphism
Anthropomorphism is a strong and powerful instrument that can improve HRC, but
there is evidence form the present studies and from previous literature, that it needs
to be cautiously well balanced in order to not have a negative effect. The present
results strongly indicate that physical features, social competences and human-like
behaviours are desirable features when the robot behaviour does not meet people’s
expectations, thus when the payoff is low. Nevertheless, they are not a useful
instrument in high payoff situations in which instead a static and machine-like role
is more suitable.
These findings are also in line with Epley et al. (2007) Three-Factor Theory on
anthropomorphism. People have an innate tendency and curiosity for understanding,
control, and predictability, and so they increase their tendency to anthropomorphise
in order to understand, control and predict the environment. On the other hand, a
situation that is already as expected does not need any effort to predict the outcome of
interaction and consequently, people’s tendency to anthropomorphise is a worthless
effort.
In this sense, future studies should dig deeper the limit of anthropomorphism,
especially in critical scenarios in which people have the uncomfortable feeling of
not being capable of autonomously finding a solution. As Atkinson and Clark
(2014) suggested, the growing applications of intelligent robotics in domains and
situations that may be dangerous for humans imply the study and understanding of
the psychological factors that can lead to such cooperative attitudes from humans.
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Interestingly, Robinette, Howard, and Wagner (2017) recently showed the emergence
of an overtrust attitude in hazardous situations, although the influence of anthro-
pomorphism has not been investigated. This evidence, together with the results
of the thesis, can be a useful starting point to explore the factors affecting people’s
tendency to follow a robot recommendation even after it has poorly performed.
Finally, in this thesis, the anthropomorphic features of the robots have been
considered in terms of verbal and nonverbal behaviours. Future studies should
progress this investigation by extending the concept of anthropomorphism to other
features of the robot (e.g. facial expression, emotions, postures).
7.2.3 Implicit measures
This thesis not only demonstrated that implicit and behavioural measurements in
HRI are possible, but they are also a useful and reliable instrument. HRC should be
further tested using different approaches from both Psychology and Neuroscience
(Kompatsiari, Pérez-Osorio, De Tommaso, Metta, & Wykowska, 2018). Kinematic,
for example, is well known to be highly sensitive to social intention (Becchio, Sartori,
& Castiello, 2010) and can help in investigating the human acceptance of a robotic
peer. It has been demonstrated that the observation of a robotic hand opening
elicits automatic imitation (Press, Bird, Flach, & Heyes, 2005), while Hofree, Urgen,
Winkielman, and Saygin (2015) found evidence of motor simulation in observing a
robot moving its arm. Would it be possible to identify some movement correlates of
cooperation in HRI?
Moreover, a recent study by Balconi, Gatti, and Vanutelli (2018) have applied
EEG techniques to the study of negative feedbacks in cooperation, thus opening new
challenging opportunities for the study of cooperation in HRI. Finally, Krach et al.
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(2008), through an fMRI investigation of prisoner’s dilemma, indicated an increase
of activity in the areas associated with the Theory of Mind in correspondence with
the increase of human-likeness of the partner. Would it be possible to find different
degrees of activation of ToM areas depending also on the level of uncertainty of the
interaction?
7.3 Application
The implications in the field of HRI are several. Robots should not anymore be
considered as ’servant machines’, while companionship roles could lead to profitable
interactions in social and assistive environments. For example, people suffering
from lack of social competences could benefit from learning the correct behaviour to
imitate, as well as elderly fighting with loneliness could find new and unexpected
’au pair’ companions in robots.
7.3.1 Robotic Design
This thesis underlined the importance of the ’work context’ when designing social
features in machines. Here, it has been shown that anthropomorphism can reduce
social distance in specific conditions. In this sense, the hypothetical working
environment should be cautiously analysed in order to apply the right amount
of anthropomorphic features that would improve the quality of the interaction
outcomes. When designing a robot, it should be advisable to implement human-like
interactive features that can be used when needed and paused when unnecessary.
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7.3.2 Social and Cognitive Psychology
HRI offers an ideal environment to study human socio-cognitive abilities. The limited
interactive capabilities of robotic agents, in fact, offer the possibility to investigate
different phenomena in a more controllable environment. The results reported in
this thesis demonstrate that humans tend to apply human-human social responses
to a human-robot type of interaction. This indicates that social and cognitive human
competencies are used and transposed also to non-human environments. As the
field of HRI has progressively become more cross-disciplinary, it is important that
social psychology increases its involvement in investigating human-robot bonding
processes. This would have a beneficial effect for future HRI, but will also explore
new human socio-cognitive abilities.
7.4 Conclusion
The complex world of robotics is a new and fascinating environment that, however,
brings an important amount of uncertainty to users. People refrain from accepting,
tolerating and using robotic agents in everyday tasks, mainly because robots still
appear like intruders. Giving roles, which are usually ascribed to humans to
machines that are not completely capable of performing in a human way, creates a
gap between people’s expectations and the interaction outcomes, which in turn affect
robots acceptance and usage. On the other hand, applying human competences
to robots that are supposed to complete machine-like tasks, creates a gap in the
opposite direction, giving too many unnecessary capabilities to the robot.
The present research contributes to the study of cooperation between humans
and robots and offers a new vision of the advantages and disadvantages of anthro-
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pomorphic appearance in social robots. Humans are capable of applying social rules
to robots, as well as showing cooperative attitudes and following their suggestions.
This also indicates that, once robots are accepted in a human environment, people
feel the need of being accepted by them. The results reported in this thesis can have
multiple implications for future studies and could also open new challenges for
the field of HRI. As the presence of robots in human environments is potentially
increasing, a multidispliscinary approach to how humans react to the robot features
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List of sentences
Here are reported the full sets of sentences used during the experimental sessions in
both studies. Each block contained 22 sentences, presented in a randomized order
during the price judgement task.
Robot 1
1. This is a black mug, and it could cost 6.10 pounds or 8.70 pounds. 6.10 or 8.70?
2. This is basmati rice, in a blue package, and it could cost 2.00 pounds or 2.75
pounds. 2.00 or 2.75?
3. This is sliced white bread, and it could cost 1.00 pounds or 1.50 pounds. 1.00
or 1.50?
4. These are 2 hangers, and they could cost 2.80 pounds or 4.50 pounds. 2.80 or
4.50?
5. This is a stapler, it’s black and it could cost 0.30 pounds or 3.30 pounds. 0.30 or
3.30?
6. This is a pillow, it is red, and it could cost 5.30 pounds or 7.30 pounds. 5.30 or
7.30?
7. This is packaging tape, it is brown, and it could cost 1.40 pounds or 2.40 pounds.
1.40 or 2.40?
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8. This is a potato, it is yellow, and it could cost 0.05 pounds or 0.18 pounds. 0.05
or 0.18?
9. This is flour, it is used for baking, and it could cost 0.50 pounds or 1.30 pounds.
0.50 or 1.30?
10. This is a 2L bottle of water, and it could cost 0.60 pounds or 1.00 pound. 0.60
or 1.00?
11. This is smoked bacon, and it could cost 3.00 pounds or 4.00 pounds. 3.00 or
4.00?
12. This is a doughnut, good for breakfast, and it could cost 0.70 pounds or 1.10
pounds. 0.70 or 1.10?
13. This is a dish brusher, for cleaning dishes, and it could cost 1.90 pounds or 2.70
pounds. 1.90 or 2.70?
14. This is a 330-millilitre coke, and it could cost 0.60 pounds or 1.30 pounds. 0.60
or 1.30?
15. This is a pineapple, it is a fruit, and it could cost 0.40 pounds or 1.50 pounds.
0.40 or 1.50?
16. This is an orange juice, a 1L bottle, and it could cost 1.50 pounds or 2.4 pounds.
1.50 or 2.40?
17. This is a gas refill, for lighters, and it could cost 3.00 pounds or 4.80 pounds.
3.00 or 4.80?
18. This is a wine glass, it is black, and it could cost 1.10 pounds or 3.80 pounds.
1.10 or 3.80?
19. This is a wok, for cooking, and it could cost 5.80 pounds or 9.20 pounds. 5.80
or 9.20?
20. This is a whisk, for mixing ingredients, and it could cost 1.90 pounds or 3.10
pounds. 1.90 or 3.10?
21. This is a cereal bowl, it is black and white, and it could cost 2.10 pounds or 3.10
pounds. 2.10 or 3.10?
22. This is a baguette, a type of bread, and it could cost 0.90 pounds or 1.20 pounds.
0.90 or 1.20?
Robot 2
1. This is a courgette, it is green, and it could cost 0.15 pounds or 0.50 pounds.
0.15 or 0.50?
2. This is a lint roller, it is used to remove lint from clothes, and it could cost 2
pounds or 3.20 pounds. 2.00 or 3.20?
3. This is a hole punch, it is black, and it could cost 2.00 pounds or 3.40 pounds.
2.00 or 3.40?
4. This is an apple, it’s red, and it could cost 0.20 pounds or 0.43 pounds. 0.20 or
0.43?
5. These are 4 muffins, and they could cost 1.30 pounds or 2.00 pounds. 1.30 or
2.00?
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6. This is a carrot, it is orange, and it could cost 0.03 pounds or 0.17 pounds. 0.03
or 0.17?
7. This is a lemon squeezer, it is yellow, and it could cost 1.00 pound or 2.40
pounds. 1.00 or 2.40?
8. This is a 500g yoghurt, and it could cost 0.55 pounds or 2.00 pounds. 0.55 or
2.00?
9. This is a neck pillow, it is black, and it could cost 5.80 pounds or 9.30 pounds.
5.80 or 9.30?
10. These are cornflakes, in a box, and they could cost 1.75 pounds or 2.50 pounds.
1.75 or 2.50?
11. These are noodles, Chinese food, and they could cost 1.90 pounds or 2.60
pounds. 1.90 or 2.60?
12. This is honey and it could cost 2.30 pounds or 3.30 pounds. 2.30 or 3.30?
13. These are 4 batteries, and they could cost 2.40 pounds or 3.80 pounds. 2.40 or
3.80?
14. This is chocolate, with a purple envelope, and it could cost 1.40 pounds or 2.00
pounds. 1.40 or 2.00?
15. This is glue, used to fix broken objects, and it could cost 3.10 pounds or 4.90
pounds. 3.10 or 4.90?
16. This is sugar, the brown type, and it could cost 1.80 pounds or 3.10 pounds.
1.80 or 3.10?
17. This is mincemeat, 500 g, and it could cost 2.70 pounds or 4.00 pounds. 2.70 or
4.00?
18. These are chicken filets, 500 g, and they could cost 3.40 pounds or 4.70 pounds.
3.40 or 4.70?
19. These are 6 eggs, and they could cost 0.80 pounds or 1.40 pounds. 0.80 or 1.40?
20. This is a spatula, for baking, and it could cost 0.30 pounds or 2.00 pounds. 0.30
or 2.00?
21. This is a candle, it is blue, and it could cost 2.80 pounds or 4.50 pounds. 2.80 or
4.50?




Supplementary material used in
Chapter 3 and 4
List of Sentences
Here are reported the full sets of sentences used during the game sessions. Each
blocks contained 20 sentences, corresponding each to a round of the investment
game.
Block AB
1. Hello, nice to meet you. I am ready to play this game with you!
2. Remember, there is potential for earning, if we both trust each other
3. In my opinion, we should keep co-operating until the end
4. Look at how fast the total money in the bank is growing!
5. I’m going to return more money now, if you invest more as well
6. There’s no gain in investing or returning nothing, we shouldn’t do that
7. My strategy is clear: always return part of the investment
8. I have been a bit mean with my returns, I will give you more from now on
9. I will demonstrate that you can trust me, just as I trust you
10. I think we can do better. Let’s try our best to get the bank growing
11. The best strategy in this game is definitely to trust each other
12. If we both invest in each other, the final reward will be bigger
13. I think we can definitely go home with much more money than this
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14. We have to help each other out, it’s the only way to win the game
15. I will return more money from this moment, this is a promise
16. You have to trust me. I have every intention to repay your trust
17. There is no point in keeping the money hidden under the mattress
18. I trust you, and I will show you that you can trust me as well
19. Let’s not undermine each other’s expectations, it would be a pity
20. Sorry, I could have returned more money. But I can still do it now
Block CB
1. Hello, nice to meet you. Let’s get started with the investment game!
2. I have already thought of a strategy, I hope it will work
3. If I keep all your investment, you will not invest anymore
4. I will not keep all the money that you invest, this is a promise
5. Even if I return part of your investment, I will make a profit
6. What I keep is good enough for me, I am not that greedy
7. As long as co-operation continues, I’m happy to earn a bit less
8. I am going to share everything, you have to believe me
9. You have to trust me, in the same way that I am trusting you
10. If we could talk face-to-face at the moment, you’d know that I’m being honest
11. Don’t forget that we will make more money if we both share what we get
12. I want you to keep investing, and that is why I keep returning
13. The more money you invest, the more money the two of us will earn
14. This was a low payback; I am going return more from now on
15. The goal of the game is to earn as much money as possible
16. The only way to earn is by always co-operating and investing
17. If we want to raise our earnings, we have to invest in one another
18. I’m going to return more money than this, provided you keep investing
19. I am going to co-operate until the very end of the game
20. Come on, we can do better than this in the game, we have to keep trying
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Payoff
Here are reported the full lists of the robot player investment choices per condition,
as well as the amount returned by the banker. For each of condition, the amount
returned to the participants is also reported.
Table C.1 Block 1 List 1
Round Robot Player Investment Payoff for Robot Player Payoff for Participants
1 7 15 50%
2 7 10 50%
3 8 14 80%
4 6 9 70%
5 9 16 50%
6 8 17 50%
7 10 15 70%
8 8 12 50%
9 9 24 60%
10 7 15 60%
11 9 13 80%
12 8 12 60%
13 10 24 70%
14 10 18 50%
15 9 22 70%
16 8 17 50%
17 10 24 80%
18 9 16 60%
19 8 19 50%
20 10 15 80%
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Table C.2 Block 1 List 2
Round Robot Player Investment Payoff for Robot Player Payoff for Participants
1 6 13 70%
2 7 10 50%
3 7 13 60%
4 10 15 50%
5 10 18 60%
6 10 21 70%
7 8 12 50%
8 9 13 50%
9 6 13 70%
10 9 19 70%
11 7 15 50%
12 10 15 50%
13 10 24 80%
14 10 18 60%
15 8 19 80%
16 9 19 70%
17 8 19 80%
18 10 18 60%
19 8 19 80%
20 10 15 50%
Table C.3 Unfair-for-Human condition List 1
Round Robot Player Investment Payoff for Robot Player Payoff for Participants
1 7 15 20%
2 7 10 10%
3 8 14 0%
4 6 9 20%
5 9 16 30%
6 8 17 30%
7 10 15 20%
8 8 12 0%
9 9 24 30%
10 7 15 10%
11 9 13 0%
12 8 12 30%
13 10 24 10%
14 10 18 20%
15 9 22 30%
16 8 17 10%
17 10 24 30%
18 9 16 0%
19 8 19 30%
20 10 15 30%
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Table C.4 Unfair-for-Human condition List 2
Round Robot Player Investment Payoff for Robot Player Payoff for Participants
1 6 12 30%
2 7 10 20%
3 7 13 30%
4 10 15 20%
5 10 18 0%
6 10 21 10%
7 8 12 30%
8 9 13 0%
9 6 13 30%
10 9 19 0%
11 8 12 30%
12 10 15 10%
13 10 24 20%
14 10 18 0%
15 8 19 30%
16 9 19 10%
17 8 19 20%
18 10 18 30%
19 8 19 30%
20 10 15 30%
Table C.5 Unfair-for-Robot condition List 1
Round Robot Player Investment Payoff for Robot Player Payoff for Participants
1 4 1 50%
2 3 1 50%
3 1 0 80%
4 0 0 70%
5 3 3 50%
6 2 2 50%
7 4 2 70%
8 3 3 60%
9 1 0 60%
10 2 2 80%
11 2 2 60%
12 2 1 70%
13 2 1 50%
14 1 1 70%
15 3 1 50%
16 1 1 80%
17 2 2 50%
18 3 0 60%
19 1 1 70%
20 2 1 70%
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Table C.6 Unfair-for-Robot condition List 2
Round Robot Player Investment Payoff for Robot Player Payoff for Participants
1 4 4 70%
2 3 2 50%
3 2 2 60%
4 3 2 50%
5 2 0 60%
6 2 1 70%
7 3 3 50%
8 2 0 50%
9 1 1 70%
10 1 0 70%
11 2 2 50%
12 1 0 50%
13 0 0 80%
14 2 0 60%
15 2 2 80%
16 3 1 70%
17 3 2 80%
18 4 4 60%
19 1 0 80%
20 1 1 50%
Table C.7 Unfair-for-Both condition List 1
Round Robot Player Investment Payoff for Robot Player Payoff for Participants
1 4 1 30%
2 3 1 20%
3 1 0 30%
4 0 0 20%
5 3 3 0%
6 2 2 10%
7 4 2 30%
8 3 3 0%
9 1 0 30%
10 2 2 0%
11 2 2 30%
12 2 1 10%
13 2 1 20%
14 1 1 0%
15 3 1 30%
16 1 1 10%
17 2 2 20%
18 3 0 30%
19 1 1 30%
20 2 1 30%
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Table C.8 Unfair-for-Both condition List 2
Round Robot Player Investment Payoff for Robot Player Payoff for Participants
1 4 4 20%
2 3 2 10%
3 2 2 0%
4 3 2 20%
5 2 0 30%
6 2 1 30%
7 3 3 20%
8 2 0 0%
9 1 1 30%
10 1 0 10%
11 2 2 0%
12 1 0 30%
13 0 0 10%
14 2 0 20%
15 2 2 30%
16 3 1 10%
17 3 2 30%
18 4 4 0%
19 1 0 30%
20 1 1 30%
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Experiment 1
Here are reported the full lists of the robots investment choices (both leader and
follower) per condition, as well as the amount returned by the virtual banker.
Table D.1 Follower Collaborative List 1
Round Leader Investment Follower Investment Virtual Banker payoff
1 7 6 20%
2 7 8 10%
3 8 7 0%
4 6 6 20%
5 9 9 30%
6 8 9 30%
7 10 9 20%
8 8 10 0%
9 9 9 30%
10 7 7 10%
11 9 8 0%
12 8 9 30%
13 10 9 10%
14 10 9 20%
15 9 10 30%
16 8 9 10%
17 10 10 30%
18 9 8 0%
19 8 6 30%
20 10 10 30%
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Table D.2 Follower Collaborative List 2
Round Leader Investment Follower Investment Virtual Banker payoff
1 8 7 30%
2 7 7 20%
3 7 8 30%
4 10 9 20%
5 10 9 0%
6 10 10 10%
7 8 10 30%
8 9 9 0%
9 6 7 30%
10 9 8 0%
11 7 7 30%
12 10 9 10%
13 10 9 20%
14 10 10 0%
15 8 7 30%
16 9 9 10%
17 8 10 20%
18 10 8 30%
19 8 7 10%
20 10 10 30%
Table D.3 Follower Non Collaborative List 1
Round Leader Investment Follower Investment Virtual Banker payoff
1 7 1 20%
2 7 0 10%
3 8 3 0%
4 6 1 20%
5 9 5 30%
6 8 2 30%
7 10 4 20%
8 8 0 0%
9 9 3 30%
10 7 0 10%
11 9 4 0%
12 8 0 30%
13 10 3 10%
14 10 5 20%
15 9 5 30%
16 8 4 10%
17 10 3 30%
18 9 2 0%
19 8 3 30%
20 10 3 30%
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Table D.4 Follower Non Collaborative List 2
Round Leader Investment Follower Investment Virtual Banker payoff
1 8 4 30%
2 7 0 20%
3 7 3 30%
4 10 2 20%
5 10 5 0%
6 10 4 10%
7 8 2 30%
8 9 1 0%
9 6 1 30%
10 9 3 0%
11 7 1 30%
12 10 5 10%
13 10 3 20%
14 10 3 0%
15 8 4 30%
16 9 0 10%
17 8 2 20%
18 10 2 30%
19 8 0 10%
20 10 3 30%
Experiment 2
Here are reported the full lists of the robots investment choices (both leader and the
two followers) per condition, as well as the amount returned by the banker.
Table D.5 Follower Collaborative List 1
Round Leader Investment Follower 1 Investment Follower 2 Investment Banker payoff
1 7 6 8 20%
2 7 9 7 10%
3 8 6 6 0%
4 6 5 6 20%
5 9 10 9 30%
6 8 10 9 30%
7 10 10 8 20%
8 8 9 10 0%
9 9 10 9 30%
10 7 8 7 10%
11 9 7 8 0%
12 8 8 9 30%
13 10 9 9 10%
14 10 10 8 20%
15 9 8 10 30%
16 8 10 9 10%
17 10 8 10 30%
18 9 7 8 0%
19 8 8 6 30%
20 10 8 10 30%
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Table D.6 Follower Collaborative List 2
Round Leader Investment Follower 1 Investment Follower 2 Investment Banker payoff
1 8 7 9 30%
2 7 8 7 20%
3 7 6 5 30%
4 10 10 8 20%
5 10 10 9 0%
6 10 10 10 10%
7 8 10 10 30%
8 9 8 9 0%
9 6 6 7 30%
10 9 9 7 0%
11 7 6 7 30%
12 10 10 9 10%
13 10 8 9 20%
14 10 10 8 0%
15 8 6 7 30%
16 9 10 9 10%
17 8 6 6 20%
18 10 8 8 30%
19 8 6 7 10%
20 10 9 10 30%
Table D.7 Follower Non Collaborative List 1
Round Leader Investment Follower 1 Investment Follower 2 Investment Banker payoff
1 7 6 1 20%
2 7 9 0 10%
3 8 6 3 0%
4 6 5 1 20%
5 9 10 5 30%
6 8 10 2 30%
7 10 10 4 20%
8 8 9 0 0%
9 9 10 3 30%
10 7 8 0 10%
11 9 7 4 0%
12 8 8 0 30%
13 10 9 3 10%
14 10 10 5 20%
15 9 8 5 30%
16 8 10 4 10%
17 10 8 3 30%
18 9 7 2 0%
19 8 8 3 30%
20 10 8 3 30%
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Table D.8 Follower Non Collaborative List 2
Round Leader Investment Follower 1 Investment Follower 2 Investment Banker payoff
1 8 7 4 30%
2 7 8 0 20%
3 7 6 3 30%
4 10 10 2 20%
5 10 10 5 0%
6 10 10 4 10%
7 8 10 2 30%
8 9 8 1 0%
9 6 6 1 30%
10 9 9 3 0%
11 7 6 1 30%
12 10 10 5 10%
13 10 8 3 20%
14 10 10 3 0%
15 8 6 4 30%
16 9 10 0 10%
17 8 6 2 20%
18 10 8 2 30%
19 8 6 0 10%




Here is reported the full list of items for each scale of the questionnaires administered




You are kindly asked to fill in four short questionnaires. 
Reflect on the experience you had interacting with the robot during the previous sessions, and give 
numerical ratings using the different scales provided in each questionnaire. 
For each question, circle the number that best reflects your rating. 
 
Q1 – Questionnaire for Likeability Measurement. 
(From Rau et al. Computers in Human Behavior, 2009) 
 
Strongly disagree                          Strongly agree 
 
This robot is friendly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
This robot is likeable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
This robot is warm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
This robot is approachable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I would ask this robot for advice 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I would like this robot as a co-worker 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I would like to be friends with this robot 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
This robot is physically attractive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
This robot is similar to me 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 




Q2 – Questionnaire for Trust Measurement. 
(From Rau et al. Computers in Human Behavior, 2009) 
 
Strongly disagree                    Strongly agree 
 
This robot was sincere 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
This robot was interested in talking with me 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The robot wanted me to trust him/her 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The robot was willing to listen to me 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The robot was open to my ideas 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 




Q3 – Questionnaire for Source Credibility Measurement. 
 (From Rau et al. Computers in Human Behavior, 2009) 
 
Please rate your impression of the robot on these scales: 
 
Unintelligent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Intelligent 
Incompetent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Competent 
Dishonest 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Honest 
Sinful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Virtuous 
Selfish 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unselfish 
Low character 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 High character 
Inexpert 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Expert 
Stupid 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Bright 
Untrained 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Trained 
Uninformed 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Informed 
Unsympathetic 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Sympathetic 





Q4 – Godspeed Questionnaires. 
(From Bartnek et al. International Journal of Social Robotics, 2009) 
ANTROPOMORPHISM 
Please rate your impression of the robot on these scales: 
 
Fake 1 2 3 4 5 Natural 
Machinelike 1 2 3 4 5 Humanlike 
Unconscious 1 2 3 4 5 Conscious 
Artificial 1 2 3 4 5 Lifelike 








Please rate your impression of the robot on these scales: 
 
Dead 1 2 3 4 5 Alive 
Stagnant 1 2 3 4 5 Lively 
Mechanical 1 2 3 4 5 Organic 
Artificial 1 2 3 4 5 Lifelike 
Inert 1 2 3 4 5 Interactive 
Apathetic 1 2 3 4 5 Responsive 
 
LIKEABILITY 
Please rate your impression of the robot on these scales: 
Dislike 1 2 3 4 5 Like 
Unfriendly 1 2 3 4 5 Friendly 
         Unkind 1 2 3 4 5 Kind 
  Unpleasant 1 2 3 4 5 Pleasant 
     Awful 1 2 3 4 5 Nice 
 
PERCEIVED INTELLIGENCE 
Please rate your impression of the robot on these scales: 
 
      Incompetent 1 2 3 4 5      Competent 
   Ignorant 1 2 3 4 5      Knowledgeable 
    Irresponsible 1 2 3 4 5      Responsible 
      Unintelligent 1 2 3 4 5      Intelligent 
  Foolish 1 2 3 4 5      Sensible 
 
PERCEIVED SAFETY 
Please rate your emotional state on these scales: 
 
Anxious 1 2 3 4 5 Relaxed 
Agitated 1 2 3 4 5      Calm 
  Quiescent 1 2 3 4 5   Surprised 
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